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NITS, GRITS, AND SOFT INFORMATION
IN SEC FILINGS
CARL W. SCHNEIDERt
The corporate image created by a prospectus, proxy statement, or
other Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filing may be likened
to a shadow-it tells something about the subject's gross outline but
in a flat, lifeless, and sometimes distorted form. Many commentators,
including SEC Chairman William J. Casey,' have suggested that SEC
disclosure filings should be more lifelike representations, devoting
greater attention to economic realities and the nitty-gritty of the
business, and including certain types of forward-looking information,
rather than boilerplate phrases and standard disclaimers which could
fit almost any filing.
Historically, certain types of information, highly relevant to in-
vestment decisions-referred to herein as "soft" information-have
been largely excluded from SEC filings, primarily because of the Com-
mission's policy. Recently, however, the SEC, analysts and other mar-
ket professionals, the courts, and investors have shown interest in
the expanded use of such information in these documents. Conse-
quently its greater use seems to be inevitable.
This Article will consider several categories of soft information
traditionally excluded from filings and will examine some of the policy
implications of this practice. Since its basic theme is to suggest a
shift in attitude to allow, and possibly even require, more soft in-
formation in SEC filings, the policies that should control the use of
such information will also be explored.
I. IDENTIFICATION OF SOFT INFORMATION
The content of SEC filings has traditionally been confined to
what may be called "hard" information, meaning statements concern-
ing objectively verifiable historical events or situations-commonly
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called "facts" 2 in SEC parlance-as distinguished from opinions, pre-
dictions, or subjective evaluations. Although a comprehensive defini-
tion of soft information is not readily apparent, several non-exclusive
and non-exhaustive categories can be identified: (1) forward-looking
statements concerning the future, such as projections, forecasts, pre-
dictions, and statements concerning plans and expectations; (2) state-
ments concerning past or present situations when the maker of the
statement lacks the data necessary to prove its accuracy-for ex-
ample, information on a company's historical share of the market,
when it does not have access to precise statistics concerning its com-
petitors; (3) information based primarily on subjective evaluations-
for example, representations concerning the competence or integrity
of management, the relative efficiency of a manufacturing operation,
or the appraised value of assets; (4) statements of motive, purpose,
or intention, since it is frequently easier to verify objectively what
was done than to determine why it was done-for example, explana-
tion of the reasons for which an auditor has been discharged;' (5)
statements involving qualifying words, such as "excellent," "inge-
nious," "efficient" and "imaginative," for which there are no generally
accepted objective standards of measurement in most contexts.4
2 The SEC has given particular stress to the difference between "fact" and other
types of information in setting forth guidelines for public disclosure of an issuer "in
registration." See SEC Securities Act Release Nos. 5180 (Aug. 16, 1971), 5009 (Oct. 7,
1969), 3844 (Oct. 8, 1957); SEC, DiscLosuRE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAiS or FEDERAL
AnmxiST rv m Poric s UNDER TH '33 AND '34 AcTS 95-96 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as WNHAT REPORT].
3 See Schneider, Developments in 1934 Act Reporting, PLI 3D INST. ONr SEC. REG.
110-11 (1972). In certain instances, motive must be disclosed. Cochran v. Channing Corp.,
211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (anti-fraud rules could be violated by failure to
disclose motive for cut in company's dividend rate). But see Lester v. Preco Indus.,
Inc., 282 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (allegation that at time of registration officers
intended to mismanage corporate funds not sufficient to bring action under anti-fraud
rules).
For an example of an attempt to examine motive, see Wall St. J., Nov. 24, 1972,
at 4, col. 3: "Asked to explain the resignation [of Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery
as auditors for International Controls Corp.], an officer replied 'There isn't any one
specific reason. In general, it related to our feeling that the auditor-client relationship
we desire to maintain can't be so any longer.' Pressed for specifics, [he] declined to
list them . ..2'
Compensating balance arrangements also fall within this category of soft informa-
tion. "Lack of disclosure [of compensating balance arrangements] has been justified
on the grounds that such arrangements were generally unwritten, informal and not
subject to precise quantification. None of these reasons are sufficient to support a
policy of nondisclosure of a phenomenon which is recognized to be real and significant."
Draft guidelines circulated by the SEC, discussed at 180 BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP.
A-10 (Dec. 6, 1972), and reprinted in id. J-1.
4In preparing a prospectus for a manufacturer of office copying machines, manage-
ment blithely described the copies produced as "permanent" in discussing the product
with the underwriters. This was in an era when many such devices made copies which
faded on exposure to sunlight. But what does the word "permanent" mean in relation
to a piece of paper, when even Dead Sea scrolls turn brittle around the edges after a
few thousand years? Although the businessmen seemed to know what a "permanent"
copy was, the lawyers were not certain. The prospectus adopted the circumlocution that
the copies would resist deterioration and fading as well as any normal printed matter,
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"Hard" and "soft" must be recognized as highly relative concepts
suggesting no sharp dividing line. Many apparently hard statements
have soft cores and vice versa. Audited historical financial statements
are normally considered to be a classic type of hard information. Ac-
counting is not an exact science, however, and many subjective evalua-
tions and other types of soft information must be considered in order to
prepare audited financials.5 On the other hand, many types of soft in-
formation contain an element of "fact." Thus, statements about a man's
excellent reputation for integrity and creativity are normally considered
to be too soft for inclusion in a prospectus, although existence of a repu-
tation has been considered a "fact" which can be proven in court under
traditional rules of evidence.6 Similarly, the existence of a plan for the
future may be treated for various purposes as a "fact," even though the
plan may be very indefinite and subject to many contingencies which
often cannot be controlled.
The dividing line between hard and soft information is sometimes
bridged by casting statements in terms of beliefs, opinions, or expecta-
tions.7 Thus, the statement that a company believes itself to be the
whatever that may mean. See Prospectus, Magnefax Corp., SEC Reg. File No. 2-17,943
(May 31, 1961).
5Soft information in financials relates to such matters as: the establishment of
reserves for bad debts, litigation, and tax audits; judgments concerning the degree of
profitability and extent of completion of open contracts when using percentage of com-
pletion accounting; judgments concerning useful lives of assets (based on factors of
wear and also obsolescence) in calculating depreciation; and valuing intangible assets,
such as patents or good will of an acquired business. Litton Industries has been questioned
for preparing earning statements improperly based upon estimates of a recovery on a
$450 million claim against the government. See 162 BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. A-10
(July 26, 1972). Chairman Casey has recently commented on this area:
It seems vital to me that [accountants] correct the impression that accounting is
something which produces exact measurements-that it is a scale on which a
business can be weighed to get an exact and precise answer as to its performance
and the degree of its progress in any particular period and its value. It seems to
me that there is a need for greater public understanding that the accounting
process relies on and produces estimates.
Accountants have encouraged the public to think of accounting as an exact
science by producing a single number result and limiting accountants' respon-
sibility to a single, segregated section of reports to shareholders, when the essence
of the accrual system of accounting is estimation and prediction of future events.
Address by SEC Chairman Casey, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
Oct. 2, 1972, at 6-7 (emphasis added).
6 C. McCoReunx, EviDEN CE § 44 (2d ed. W. Cleary 1972). Traditional rules of
evidence sometimes distinguished between reputation and character. A man's character
is said to be too subjective or elusive an attribute to be a proper subject of evidence,
although his reputation is an objective, provable fact.
Reputation, of course, differs somewhat from an opinion held by a particular indi-
vidual. Id. Thus, a particular individual may hold another person in low regard, although
the holder of the opinion may recognize that the subject of the opinion has an excellent
reputation.
7Chairman Casey made a similar point in a recent speech regarding the Commission's
reconsideration of its policy on forecasts:
Then, there is the question of whether we can really justify the prohibition of
forecasts which are carefully prepared, relied on for budgeting and planning
purposes, based on comprehensive data and reasonable assumptions and well
articulated and regularly supplemented to reflect supervening developments and
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largest producer of a product purports to be a statement of a "fact"-
that is, the fact about the belief held-even though the subject of the
belief may be soft information, if the company does not have precise
information about its competitors.
The Commission has been particularly ingenious in turning soft
representations into hard ones (one might call them pseudo-hard) by
using the "implied representation" technique. This approach is em-
ployed extensively by the SEC in broker-dealer administrative pro-
ceedings, typically when a salesman has made a very optimistic forecast
expressed in terms of his opinion or belief. The Commission holds that
every expression of opinion contains an implied representation of "fact"
-namely, the fact that the opinion has an adequate basis. If the Com-
mission discerns no adequate basis for the opinion, it finds a misrepre-
sentation in this implied factual representation.
8
The dividing line may be especially blurred when dealing with the
future, depending on whether the statement is an affirmative representa-
tion about what will occur or a statement about a present plan or expec-
tation for the future. The relative hardness of a statement should turn
less on its form (for example, a statement concerning what will happen
as opposed to a statement of present expectation) and more on the un-
derlying substance. If a company has a firm agreement to buy a prop-
erty, with closing scheduled ten days after the effective date of its
prospectus, and all closing preconditions have been satisfied, a statement
that the company "will" (or presently proposes to) purchase the prop-
erty may be considered reasonably hard, and, therefore, acceptable for
prospectus inclusion under current practice. But a statement that the
company will (or even the softer statement that it presently expects or
proposes to) open one hundred additional branches over the next five
years, when no further locations have been selected, would be too soft
for inclusion in a prospectus under prevailing standards.
II. PREVAIING PRACTICES OF ExcLusIos
There has been something of a "conspiracy of silence" in excluding
soft information from SEC filings. The Commission and private parties
preparing SEC filings, each for their own reasons, have generally (with
revisions in estimates. If we do prohibit forecasts which a company makes and
circulates, are we subjecting the company to statutory liability for failure to
disclose a material fact? The forecast is an estimate but its existence and the
articulated judgment it represents is a fact.
Address by SEC Chairman Casey, Financial Executives Institute, Oct. 18, 1972, at 16-17
(emphasis added).
8 Cohen & Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice Standards, 29 LAw & CoNTraMw.
POa. 691, 704-05 (1964). The Commission has gone so far as to establish conclusively
that certain types of opinions may never be adequately based in fact, such as opinions
that there will be a very sharp rise in the market price of a speculative security.
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some exceptions) excluded soft information from such filings. Although
the prevailing attitude on soft information has emerged primarily in
contexts concerning registration statements filed under the 1933 Act,'
the same approach is normally applied (with some exceptions) on a
fairly uniform basis to other types of filings-proxy statements and
periodic reports for example.
A. The Traditional SEC Position
The Commission has been motivated by a desire to protect in-
vestors against questionable selling literature, as well as to aid in the
enforcement of statutory liabilities.10 SEC filings, especially 1933 Act
prospectuses, traditionally have been considered to be among the most
accurate and reliable (although not necessarily the most useful) sources
of information available to investors. The Commission tries to confine
these documents to hard information to assure a continued high degree
of reliability. Moreover, since it is generally more difficult to prove an
inaccuracy in soft information, the limitation of filings to hard informa-
tion makes it easier to establish accountability for inadequate dis-
closures.
Furthermore, according to the traditional SEC view, the inclusion
of soft information in filings would clothe such information with an
unduly high aura of credibility. Investors assume, with a great deal of
justification, that information appearing in SEC filings has been pre-
pared with considerable care, tending to assure its accuracy.'- There-
fore, under the SEC's approach, if soft information appeared in a
prospectus, the public would incorrectly assume an unwarranted degree
of reliability-that a prediction or projection would almost certainly be
fulfilled, or that any statement made is subject to verification by ob-
jective evidence.
The bootstrap element in this logic is apparent. If the public as-
sumes that filed information is completely verifiable by objective data,
9 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1933
Act].
1OFor two excellent and rather critical expositions of the traditional SEC position,
see Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1151 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Myths]; Mann, Prospectuses: Unreadable or Just
Unread?-A Proposal to Reexamine Policies Against Permitting Projections, 40 GEo.
WAsH. L. REv. 222 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Prospectuses]. A more sympathetic anal-
ysis of the SEC position appears in Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal
Securities Regulations, 16 Bus. LAW. 300 (1961). For a judicial exposition of the tradi-
tional SEC view, see Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400, 408-09
(ND). Ill. 1964).
1l Investors may also assume, with some though by no means total justification,
that the SEC itself has verified the statements in a prospectus, notwithstanding the
boldface warning on the cover to the contrary. The Staff certainly does make comments
or requests for supplemental information designed to verify the accuracy and adequacy
of some disclosures, especially those which have elements of softness.
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it does so precisely because filings have been confined in the past to
hard information. This cause and effect cycle could be broken easily,
however, if a new policy were adopted to permit greater use of soft in-
formation in filings. Indeed, the Commission's view does not deny either
the relevance of soft information in making investment decisions, or
the fact that soft information is used extensively (and quite appropri-
ately) by investors. Rather, the traditional Staff attitude may be sum-
marized to the effect that soft information is all right in its place, but
an SEC filing is not its place.
The SEC's hostility to soft information is particularly evident in
its comment letter practice. With insights sometimes suggestive of
paranoia, the Staff has shown particular zeal for detecting, and request-
ing the deletion of, implied predictions in seemingly inoffensive lan-
guage. Also Staff requests for supplemental information (for its own
use but not for inclusion in filings), apply with disproportionate fre-
quency, and occasionally with chilling effect, to statements suspected
of being soft, such as representations about a company's competitive
position, or about the management's beliefs in that regard.'
B. Acquiescence by Private Parties
Issuers, underwriters, and their counsel generally have acquiesced
as a matter of self-protection in the traditional exclusionary policy of
the SEC regarding soft information. They are not anxious to assume
needless exposure to potential liability by making soft representations
which may be difficult to substantiate, especially if a reasonably based
soft statement (such as a prediction or subjective evaluation) made in
good faith proves to be incorrect.
Since securities are sold primarily through oral sales efforts, with
supplemental information often being supplied to dealers through under-
writers' memoranda which are not filed with the SEC,"3 there has been
relatively little pressure by issuers and underwriters to allow (or re-
1 2 In one situation in the author's experience, the initial filing set forth management's
broadly stated beliefs about the company's industry position. This belief was based
primarily on the accumulated feel for the industry acquired by the executives over
many years of personal contracts. Management's more specific beliefs, expressed privately
to the underwriters in preparing the registration statement, could have been erroneous
by a wide margin, and still the much more general statement in the prospectus would
have been completely accurate. Despite the absence of objective data, counsel and
underwriters were completely satisfied with the statement made in the initial filing.
On review, however, the Staff raised so many questions about the basis for management's
belief, that the statement was finally modified rather than risk further delay by prolonged
discussions. Cf. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.
1970) (disclosure of "fact" of anticipated price per share considered improper), dis-
cussed in SEC, CoxsEQUENcEs or CoiuoRATz ACQISITION S 172-77 (C. Schneider, J.
Bauman & H. Wander eds. 1971).1 3 Such documents may be supplied supplementally to the SEC (SEC Securities Act
Release No. 4936, U 42 (Dec. 9, 1968)), but they are not "filed" or subject to the
liabilities which attach to deficient filings as such.
1972]
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quire) more soft information in prospectuses. A prospectus is a some-
what schizophrenic document, which might serve either a selling or
liability-prevention function. Faced with the enormous potential li-
abilities for a deficient filing, most private parties have opted to stress
the preventive function, treating the prospectus as an insurance policy. 4
They can take comfort in the knowledge that the prospectus contains
only statements that are demonstrably provable by objective evidence
already at hand.
Additionally, preparation of a filing in accordance with the tradi-
tional formula can reduce the delay and trauma inherent in the pro-
cessing procedure. A pragmatic adjustment to these realities by those
who prepare filings has ingrained habits very deeply, and consequently
the traditional approach has become a generally accepted pattern. One
actively engaged in the securities business can easily forget how stylized
and stilted this genre of literature appears to the uninitiated.
C. Exceptions to the Practice of Exclusion
Exceptions exist to the general policy of excluding soft information.
One may detect a wide variety of relatively soft statements in many
filings. For example, the application of proceeds section of prospectuses
and certain data in Form S-11 (the form for various types of real estate
offerings)," expressly require forward-looking information. The intro-
ductory statement in a prospectus, which describes so-called risk factors
and speculative aspects, tends to develop some soft areas.1 Further-
more, there has apparently been a slight shift in the Commission's atti-
tude recently, resulting in more toleration of soft information in filings
when it is particularly material and useful to investors.17 For instance,
14 See text accompanying notes 30-31 infra.
15 See SEC Form S-11, Item 6(b), calling for future estimates of cash flow and
taxable income in certain cases.
16SEC Securities Act Release No. 4936, Guide No. 6 (Dec. 9, 1968), as amended,
SEC Securities Act Release No. 5278, Guide No. 6 (July 26, 1972).
17The Commission's recent suggestions regarding prospectuses of broker-dealers
which offer their own securities publicly may well reflect this trend. See SEC Securities
Act Release No. 5222 (Jan. 3, 1972). These suggestions expressly call for various types
of soft information. The guidelines as a whole convey the impression that more soft
information than has been typical would not only be tolerated, but would be required
in prospectuses of broker-dealers.
For example, the Commission suggests discussion concerning the competitive impact
on the issuer-which might well be favorable-of developments such as access of financial
institutions and broker-dealers to various market places, the impact of NASDAQ and
other automated quotation systems, revision of commission rate structures, trends toward
public ownership, antitrust implications of present industry practices, and pending
proposals for industry change. Id. ff 5. These topics represent highly sensitive and unclear
areas, in a state of flux with numerous unknowns. The Commission historically has
neither expected nor required discussions of comparable imponderables which face issuers
in other industries. The Commission's intimate familiarity with the brokerage business
no doubt gives it confidence that it can exercise some independent judgment in processing
broker-dealer filings, a factor which probably increases its willingness to deal with soft
information concerning this particular industry.
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the Staff is reconsidering its traditional prohibition of financial projec-
tions in filings.38 Such a shift in attitude is clearly consistent with Chair-
man Casey's call for more economic reality."2
As a matter of practice, the Commission has been more tolerant of
soft information in filings concerned with acquisitions (mergers, ex-
change offers, and so forth), tender offers, and proxy contests.2 ° In these
situations an investor most clearly needs "fair," as contrasted with
"conservative," disclosure. When an investment decision involves a
choice between two securities (or two managements), the alternate
choice may seem to be relatively better than it really is, if an overly
conservative presentation makes one security (or management) appear
worse than it in fact is. Furthermore, in an adversary situation, such
as a proxy contest or disputed tender, each contestant can raise ap-
propriate challenges to the soft information offered by the other, thus
tending to assure that investors will not be misled.
Furthermore, the SEC has adopted a double standard, depending
on whether soft information is favorable or adverse. It has considered
is See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9844 (Nov. 1, 1972). A recent proposal for
more disclosures regarding substantial write-offs and charges against income would also
call for a great deal of predictive information. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5313
(Oct. 2, 1972).
1 0 Chairman Casey drew particular attention to the economic realities relating to
compensating balance arrangements for bank loans. Address by SEC Chairman Casey,
American Bankers Association, Mar. 17, 1972, reported in 144 BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP.
A-7 (Mar. 22, 1972). He stated that disclosure could not be avoided merely because there
was no written contractual commitment. In many cases, disclosure of non-contractual
compensating balance arrangements would be relatively soft, since the arrangements
may be vague. Although Chairman Casey indicated that the Commission has "not yet
required this form of disclosure for companies under our 1933 Act powers," Staff com-
ment letters recently have been requesting disclosure of compensating balance arrange-
ments. Id.
Chairman Casey has urged public companies to give more evaluation and forward-
looking information in annual reports to shareholders. Address by SEC Chairman
Casey, American Society of Corporate Securities Annual Meeting, June 6, 1972, reported
in 156 BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. A-19 (June 14, 1972). The Commission has been pressing
to have disclosures in Form 10-K reports to the SEC and disclosures in annual reports
to shareholders become more equivalent. Id. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9672 (July
26, 1972). The result inevitably may be Form 10-K reports which come closer to the
style of disclosure used in annual shareholders reports, including soft information.
2 0 Indeed, in at least one situation, traditional roles were reversed and the Com-
mission insisted on the inclusion of long term financial projections in an acquisition
proxy statement. The issuer vigorously resisted on the grounds that the particular
projections, under the assumptions prescribed by the Commission, did not represent a
realistic forecast of the future, and that the public might give undue predictive signifi-
cance to the projections, notwithstanding disclaimers, simply because they appeared in
an SEC filing. The projections requested by the Staff made no allowance for the economic
reality motivating the transaction-the expectation that significant economies would result
from the combination of two similar businesses.
A significant amount of the litigation challenging the adequacy of disclosure under
the anti-fraud rules relates to alleged deficiencies in relatively soft information, typically
future plans, in connection with acquisitions. See, e.g., Kohn v. American Metal Climax,
Inc., 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 120 (1972); Susquehanna Corp. v.
Pan American Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1970); Feit v. Leasco Data Process-
ing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,
298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J.
1955); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), aff'd, 235 F.2d
369, 373 (3d Cir. 1956).
19721
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disclosure of soft information to be mandatory when the information
creates fairly specific and highly negative inferences, although disclo-
sures on the same subjects are normally prohibited if the information
is favorable. It has required negative disclosures, for example, on such
topics as plant efficiency,2 management integrity,2 labor relations,'
pending antitrust negotiations with the Justice Department, 4 antici-
pated changes in a company's competitive position,25 or trends reflected
in recent interim earnings,26 topics on which favorable disclosures would
probably be prohibited.
As another indication of changed attitude, the Commission recently
proposed various steps to control abuses of hot issues.2 Several of the
proposals relate to expanded disclosure obligations and, to a significant
extent, they deal with soft information. Thus, there is a proposal to add
new disclosure obligations for issuers filing a first 1933 Act registration
statement who have not conducted bona fide operations for a period of
at least three years prior to the filing. Their prospectuses would be re-
quired to: "Describe, if available, the registrant's plan of operation" for
the immediate future, the disclosure to "include such matters as: (a) If
available, a budget of anticipated cash expenditures and resources which
should present on a quarterly basis the principal categories of expenses
expected to be incurred ... , These proposals reflect Chairman
2 1 Clinton Engines Corp., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4724 (Sept. 28, 1964).
2 2 Franchard Corp., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4710 (July 31, 1964).
23 Levitz Furniture Corp., SEC Securities Act Release No. 5295 (Sept. 6, 1972),
holding that a prospectus should have disclosed "to the extent possible . .. the effects
of [the union's] organizing campaign and the proposed labor contract terms on registrant's
business operations, employee relations and income." Id. at 3. But see Prettner v. Aston,
339 F. Supp. 273, 290-91 (D. Del. 1972) (no need to speculate about adverse impact of
merger on labor relations, where "there had not been a work stoppage or strike in
similar circumstances in the preceding ten years").
24The SEC charged ITT with violating the anti-fraud rules for failing to disclose
material information in a prospectus supplement, regarding a change in the settlement
posture, the substance of settlement negotiations and subsequent material developments
in the negotiations between ITT and the Justice Department relative to ITT's alleged
antitrust violations. SEC v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp. CCH Fan. Sa. L. R t,.
ff 93,535 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1972) (consent injunction on complaint described in 157
BNA SEc. REG. & L. RaP. A-6 (June 21, 1972)). Describing accurately the posture of a
negotiation which is not yet completed is extremely difficult due to the highly subjective
nature of the evaluation to be made, the fact that each party may not be stating its
most conciliatory position to the other, and the possibility that a party's position might be
jeopardized if it had to make public disclosures which become available to the other
party about its view of the negotiations.
2 5 See SEC v. Granco Products, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 968, 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Uni-
versal Camera Corp., 19 S.E.C. 648, 655-56 (1945) (anticipated problems in transition
from wartime to peacetime market).
26 Doman Helicopters, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 431 (1963).
27 SEC Securities Act Release Nos. 5274-79 (July 26, 1972).
28 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5276, at 7-8 (July 26, 1972) (proposing amend-
ments for Form S-1). Corresponding changes were proposed in Form S-2 and Exchange
Act Forms 10 and 10-K.
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Casey's view that disclosures should focus on economic reality.29 The
Chairman has specifically rejected the insurance policy analogy,30 often
used by securities lawyers,31 as being an appropriate point of orientation
for a prospectus.
Whatever objections one may have to the specific proposals, they
should be welcome insofar as they reflect a breakdown of the Com-
mission's generally rigid attitude banning soft information. However,
the hot issue proposals have a very specific orientation. The Commission
was quite concerned with "new ventures which seem to have little or no
actual economic viability."32 Thus, despite some minor indication to the
contrary,33 the general theme underlying the several interrelated pro-
posals seems to be an effort to force disclosure of more adverse or nega-
tive information.
The hot issue proposals grew out of a study of the specific problems
generated by hot issues, not out of an overall reevaluation of disclosure
policy. The proposals thus did not focus on the fact that almost all
issuers, including the strongest and most successful companies, have
available soft information that would be useful to potential investors.
Rather, the focus of attention was on high risk companies which were
going public without meaningful disclosure of such risks.
Thus, we have an anomaly. The first Commission proposal for
forward-looking financial information in filings, in the form of budgets,
would be mandatory and would apply only to those companies which,
as a class, would probably find it the hardest to develop reliable predic-
tions-start-up enterprises filing a first registration statement. The
Commission did not make any concurrent proposal to permit (or re-
quire) forward-looking financial data for well-established companies
which presumably would have both the historical data and the manage-
ment skill for preparing reliable earnings forecasts.3
2 9-See speeches cited in note I supra.
3 Address by SEC Chairman Casey, Texas Bar Association, in 160 BNA SEC. REG.
& L. REP. A-3 (July 12, 1972).
3 1 E.g., Schneider & Manko, Going Public: Practice, Procedure and Consequences,
15 Vx. L. REv. 283, 293 (1970).
32 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5275, at 2 (July 26, 1972).
3A proposed revision in Form S-1, Item 9, Instruction 2, calls for expanded informa-
tion on "positive and negative factors pertaining to the competitive position of the
registrant." SEC Securities Act Release No. 5276, at 6 (July 26, 1972). It remains to be
seen how the Staff would administer the provision relating to positive competitive factors,
where a start-up enterprise believed that its intended method of operations for the future
would give it an advantage over well-established competitors.
4For some time, the Commission has been actively considering a more general use
of financial projections in filings. It has solicited opinions from several industry groups
and hearings in this area were scheduled to begin November 20, 1972; see SEC Exchange
Act Release No. 9844 (Nov. 1, 1972).
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III. THE NEED FOR CHANGE
A. Effects of the Traditional Approach
Most SEC filings have a tone of extreme "conservatism," with a
tendency to accentuate all negative, pessimistic, adverse, or "bearish"
factors, and much more explanation of the down-side risk than the up-
side potential. The traditional practice has been oriented toward the
potential new investor, and reflects a policy judgment that it is highly
important to protect him against buying a security which is worse than
he thinks, but relatively less important to protect him against missing
a favorable opportunity.
Often the result is not, in fact, "fair," "balanced," or "realistic"
disclosure in any meaningful sense, but rather disclosure which is un-
balanced and unduly pessimistic. One experienced practitioner describes
the typical executive's reaction to his company's prospectus as: "If I
believed that was a fair picture of the company, I'd look for another
job."3' 5 Thus SEC filings generally have an artificial or unreal quality.
They purport to be full disclosure documents but, as a matter of con-
vention, they exclude important types of information investors consider
relevant, and stress much information investors consider irrelevant or
relatively unimportant0 6 Although the ban on soft information is most
effective in excluding favorable information, it often serves as well to
screen negative aspects of a company from the public37
B. Criticisms of the Traditional Approach
A district court recently characterized prospectuses in damning
terms-and it is noteworthy that the opinion refers to prospectuses in
general and not simply the particular prospectus before the court in the
lawsuit:
In at least some instances, what has developed in lieu of
the open disclosure envisioned by the Congress is a literary
35 Prospectuses, supra note 10, at 231 n.43.
36 Disclosure serves useful functions in addition to conveying information relevant to
investment decisions. Disclosure is a deterrent against over-reaching as well as an aid to
enforcement. To a large extent, the detailed information on compensation, executive
stock options, and transactions with management serve principally to deter over-reaching
and are of little informational value to investors. The very fact that disclosure is required
helps to insure that a transaction will be reasonable and therefore uninteresting to
investors who read disclosure filings for investment information. Without suggesting that
disclosures of this nature should be eliminated, they could be reduced without diminishing
the deterrent effect.
It is interesting to compare SEC filings with investment manuals prepared by com-
mercial services. The manuals are specifically designed to give investors the type of
information desired for making investment decisions. It is very rare for these manuals
to include any of the prospectus type information relative to compensation, management
perquisites, and management transactions.
37 The Commission's proposed hot issue controls are, in large measure, an attempt
to remove this screen.
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art form calculated to communicate as little of the essential
information as possible while exuding an air of total candor.
Masters of this medium utilize turgid prose to enshroud the
occasional critical revelation in a morass of dull, and-to all
but the sophisticates-useless financial and historical data.
In the face of such obfuscatory tactics the common or even
the moderately well informed investor is almost as much at
the mercy of the issuer as was his pre-SEC parent. He cannot
by reading the prospectus discern the merit of the offering
3 8
Professor Homer Kripke, a leading member of the academic com-
munity (whose career has included service as a senior Commission
official), states:
I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 is not operating as it should, that the prospec-
tus has become a routine, meaningless document which does
not serve its purpose.3 9
Professor Kripke characterized the prospectus as "perfunctory," "ster-
ile" and "fairly close to worthless."4 A leading securities lawyer has
similarly summarized the situation:
The real problem with the statutory prospectus is not
that it is unreadable, but that it is unread. It is unread because
it does not contain that information which the investor con-
siders crucial to his investment decision.4
The disclosure problem has usually been viewed as paramount.
Two thoughtful securities analysts have criticized the SEC's policy of
viewing disclosure
as merely a branch of trading regulation ... to insure fairer
markets at the expense of serious investors .... [W]hat the
SEC thinks is a material fact is not necessarily what those in-
volved in using facts consider either material or fact. Investors
3 8 
Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 565 (E.D.N.Y.
1971).
39 Address by Homer Kripke, Annual Meeting of Banking, Corporation and Business
Law Section, New York State Bar Association, Jan. 27, 1972, Proceedings at 19. Pro-
fessor Kripke also offered this interesting metaphor:
We would not think much of a military general staff or intelligence staff
which told the field commander that they were not going to give him their esti-
mates as to the enemy's strength and dispositions for fear that they might not be
accurate or complete, but would prefer to give him something that they were
sure was reliable, like information about the enemy's dispositions in World War
II. And yet that is essentially comparable to what the Commission is doing.
Id. 26.
401 d. 19-20.
41 Prospectuses, supra note 10, at 223.
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ought to be able to get more facts which the SEC does not now
consider either material or fact.
Chairman Casey reached a similar conclusion:
Disclosure has been an arcane business. The real prob-
lem of securities work is that the caution that has gone into
the disclosure process has produced items so carefully hedged
that few investors can make use of them. Reams of boiler
plate incantations were spawned by years of lawyers looking
out for their client companies. These doom-filled documents
have become largely ignored in the fourth decade of their
existence ....
[A] backward looking prospectus only tells half of the story.
Investors do not put up their money solely on the basis of past
history. They are always partly sold, and particularly in the
new issue area, by verbal assurances about the prospects of
the company. Such projections are at least as valuable, if not
more so, than the past three year's financial record, particu-
larly if the company is just starting up.O
These harsh criticisms, each of which is related, at least in part,
to the exclusion of soft information, should be evaluated in context. It
would be an overstatement to suggest that every prospectus is totally
useless. Even with a revised approach towards soft information and
other standards of disclosure, it may well be that prospectuses for some
issuers would remain essentially as they are under current standards.
But, in a significant number of instances, reading a prospectus with-
out soft information is like watching a performance of Hamlet with the
role of the prince unfilled. In either case, the viewer may get some in-
teresting tidbits of background information, but very little idea of what
the real story is all about.
The purpose of the disclosure statutes is frustrated, to the disad-
vantage of public investors, when available material information is kept
out of disclosure filings. In balancing competing policy goals-to inform
4 2 Whitman & Shubik, Corporate Realty and Accounting for Investors, FmxcixA
EXECUTIVF, May, 1971, at 2, 9, 13.
In a statement which the Financial Analysts Federation submitted to the SEC on
March 2, 1972, in connection with the hot issues study, they concluded, at 2-3:
There is unanimity of opinion on the part of the Subcommittee that the
Commission's rules, regulations, and forms under the Securities Act of 1933 do
not result in adequate disclosures that reflect economic reality regarding the
business and financial operations of registrants offering new issues, and that the
Commission's rules under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 do not provide
adequate protection to investors and, therefore, may tend to foster inappropriate
valuations in the market place. . . . Rather, the format and content of the
offering prospectus is generally inadequate to enable the analyst and/or investor
to properly arrive at a decision as to the reasonableness of the offering price
relative to the background and potential of the company involved.
4 Address by SEC Chairman Casey, New York Law Journal and the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York, Apr. 21, 1972, at 5, 8-9.
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investors and at the same time protect them against improper selling
practices-the time has come to opt for more disclosure. It is thus sug-
gested that the traditional ban on soft information in SEC filings be
relaxed somewhat when soft information is relevant, material, reliable
to an acceptable degree, and adequately qualified in its presentation so
that investors will appreciate its soft character. In an area where ex-
tremely fine and subtle distinctions are drawn," this suggestion for
change relates primarily to matters of degree, emphasis, approach, and
even bias, rather than an outright repudiation and reversal of long-
standing policies. As a general principle, the SEC should move slowly
and experimentally in permitting (and requiring) soft disclosures.
C. The Value of a More Flexible Approach
1. Increased Responsibility and Reliability
Certain types of soft information are highly relevant in making in-
vestment decisions and, in fact, are commonly used in the securities
markets. The inclusion of such information in formal filings, as con-
trasted with its dissemination through oral sales efforts, is likely to
make it more responsible and reliable in the long run. Those who
prepare SEC filings tend to be cautious and conservative in what they
commit to writing. The inclusion of a statement in a filing would tend
to restrain the natural enthusiasm of registered representatives in deal-
ing orally with individual customers. Certainly the distribution of in-
formation through a filing, rather than oral selling channels, will expose
the distributor to greater liabilities both legally and practically (for
example, by simplifying the proof of what representations were made),
thereby tending to assure increased reliability.
2. The Prevailing Approach is Counter-Productive
The extreme negativism characterizing filings has been counter-
productive to the goal of investor protection. When every situation is
made to look bad, it is hard to distinguish the truly bad from the moder-
ately bad and, indeed, from the genuinely good. Thus, with all statements
of future plans followed by the same pro forma disclaimer-that there is
no assurance of success-and with no estimate of the realistic probabili-
ties ever permitted, the value of the warning has become diluted. The
situation may be illustrated by one offering within the author's experi-
44 For example, the Wheat Report suggested generally that the type of projections
which would be prohibited in a prospectus should not be published outside of the
prospectus while an issuer is in registration. However, the Report's recommendations
would permit public utilities to continue publication during the waiting period of regular
and customary estimates of kilowatt hour sales for the forthcoming year, although such
projections would be barred from the utility's prospectus. WnEAT RaoRT supra note 2,
at 134-35.
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ence in which the company's position had deteriorated between the
initial filing and the effective date. The initial filing, following the cus-
tomary pattern, was so negative that there was no meaningful way to
make the warning more emphatic for the final prospectus. Can one be
expected to add: "P.S. We really mean it this time."?
3. The Traditional Approach is Inconsistent
with the Basic Disclosure Philosophy
The general premise of the securities laws is to give investors all
relevant information, and rely on them to make their own evaluations.
In effect, the traditional view on soft information is based on the
paternalistic view that certain investors may misuse such information.
The result is that soft information is kept not only from the unsophisti-
cated but also from the highly sophisticated investors who would use it
effectively and properly. In effect, the system is tailored to the lowest
common denominator of investor sophistication, to the detriment of all
others. The benefits to be gained by making more relevant information
avaliable to all investors justify the minimal risk that some investors
may attach too high a level of credibility to a soft disclosure.
4. Various Types of Filings Present Different Considerations
One may concede, arguendo, that highly conservative disclosure is
appropriate when the principal users of a disclosure document will be
prospective new investors, as in the case of a prospectus for a first public
offering. Different standards should apply, however, to periodic reports,
proxy statements and, to some extent, 1933 Act registration statements
of companies that are already publicly owned.45 SEC filings for publicly
owned companies provide a reservoir of information which is relied
upon both by existing investors who must consider whether to hold or
sell the securities, and by prospective new investors. From the view-
point of the overall trading market, overly conservative disclosure is
no more fair to existing investors than is overly optimistic disclosure
fair to prospective new investors 6 There should thus be a greater
45 Investors in the trading market and analysts may rely on 1933 Act prospectus
information, even if they are not purchasing securities in the registered distribution. See
Colonial Realty Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 337 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
46 Historically, the first task which the Congress delegated to the Commission
was that of protecting buyers of securities to whom companies and underwriters
offered new issues of securities .... This has over the years produced a bias
toward calling for the utmost conservatism, towards demanding understatement,
towards excluding judgments and expressions of opinion in describing a company
and its prospects. This approach has been effective in curbing the more exuberant
and less responsible promoter, albeit with side effects which have developed a
negativism in new issue propectuses which has impaired their usefulness, a con-
dition we are trying to correct by rejecting boilerplate and calling for specific
descriptions and expressions of judgments and opinion if they are well based.
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effor 7 to achieve "fair" rather than "conservative" disclosure in docu-
ments which may significantly influence both of these groups.
Consider the irony in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,48 a land-
mark case dealing with inadequate disclosure (albeit not in an SEC
filing). There the principal deficiency in a critical first press release was
its overly conservative or negative disclosure about the company's min-
eral discoveries. This undue pessimism caused existing shareholders to
sell their holdings and incur losses totalling millions of dollars! 9 Al-
though bad faith was found on the part of the press release draftsmen, it
is easy to imagine how an experienced securities lawyer, dealing under
great pressure with a similarly fluid and uncertain situation, would tend
as a matter of instinct and tradition toward a very conservative and
understated approach in drafting a press release.
5. The Traditional Approach Underestimates Investors' Capabilities
The fear has been expressed that investors will attach too much
credibility to soft information in SEC filings. This traditional objection
to soft information, however, underestimates the capability of investors,
who are generally accustomed to dealing with soft information through
the normal workings of the trading markets. While blatant puffing is
not considered proper under the securities law, investors realize that,
within a permissible range, managements may tend to be fairly op-
timistic, and management opinion can be evaluated in that light. The
benefits to be gained by making more relevant information available
But where this historical bias has really given way and where it is of great
significance to investor relations people is when it has had the effect of under-
informing existing shareholders by withholding from them management's opinions
and judgments about the future. These shareholders are not necessarily buyers
as are those to whom new issue prospectuses are addressed. They need informa-
tion which will help them to decide whether to hold what they have or sell.
If they are not given a full picture they may sell themselves out too cheaply.
Thus, when we put restrictions on management passing along to stockholders
information about appreciation in the value of assets, the prospects of new
discoveries, the development of new technologies and methods and products,
we may be putting existing shareholders at a disadvantage in their investment
decisions and dealings with those who are able to acquire realistic information
in the market place and elsewhere. Opinion, judgment and all future oriented
information calls for prudence and care in developing the factual basis and
drawing a conclusion but that is no reason for prohibiting it.
Address by SEC Chairman Casey, National Investor Relations Institute, Oct. 3, 1972, at
2-4 (emphasis added).
In Epstein v. Kearns, CCH FaD. SEc. L. REP. II 93,625 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 2, 1972),
a shareholder made the interesting contention that insiders violated the anti-fraud rules
when they caused the company to prepare a prospectus with too conservative a de-
scription, knowing that the insiders themselves were intended to be major purchasers
of the registered securities.
4 7 See text accompanying note 20 supra.
48401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
490n remand, the district court ordered that those privy to unpublished informa-
tion pay their profits into a special escrow account for defrauded stockholders. See
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
1972]
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to a large body of investors justify the minimal risks that some investors
may attach too high a level of credibility to a soft disclosure. If the
public is told that a company earned $1.00 a share last year, expects
to earn $1.50 for the current year which is nine months complete, and
projects $2.00 for next year, most investors, and certainly all brokers,
should be able to distinguish the degree of credibility for each of the
three figures, and appropriately discount the certainty of the short and
long term future projections.
6. Discrimination Against Small Investors
Public confidence in our securities markets requires that, to the
extent practicable, all investors have equal access to available informa-
tion, with no preference for large investors or institutions. 0 Under pre-
vailing practice, however, if there is a story of economic reality to tell
based on soft information which does not appear in a prospectus, it is
most likely that the large customer will be given first preference in
receiving supplemental information as part of routine selling activity.
To the extent that soft information is going to be used properly in con-
nection with selling activity, it should be included in the prospectus
so as to be available on an equal basis to all investors.
IV. GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE POLICY
A. Mandatory vs. Permissive Disclosures
In developing a new approach to soft information, different policy
considerations underlie mandatory and permissive disclosures. Notwith-
standing frequent statements that SEC filings require "full disclosure"
of all relevant information, it is quite clear that a filing need not "state
every fact about stock offered that a prospective purchaser might like
to know or that might, if known, tend to influence his decision .... 51
In order to comply fully with the filing requirements, disclosure must
be made only of information required by the particular disclosure form,
or necessary to make the statements made not misleading, that is, to
avoid half-truth.2 While the half-truth prohibition is often interpreted
50 SEC v. Glen Alden Corp., CCH FED. SEc. L. RFP. II 92,280 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
SEC, Statement on the Future Structure of Securities Markets (Feb. 2, 1972), reprinted
in 137 BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. Part II; NEw YORK STOCK ExCHANGE CoarPANrY
MANUAL. A-20 (July 18, 1968).
51 Otis & Co. v. SEC, 106 F.2d 579, 582 (6th Cir. 1939).
52 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1970), Rule 408, 17 C.F.R. § 230.408 (1971)
(relating to registration statement); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a
et seq. (1970) (hereinafter cited as 1934 Act], Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1971)
(relating to proxy statements) ; id. Rule 12b-20, '17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (1971) (relating
to other 1934 Act statements and reports). Little significance attaches to the variations
in wording among the many prohibitions against half-truths.
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quite broadly-sometimes excessively soO-sthe law has not approached
the point that all relevant information must be disclosed in SEC filings.
There are various types of clearly relevant soft information which need
not (and indeed often may not) be disclosed.
As a matter of sound jurisprudence and, to some extent, constitu-
tional due process, mandatory disclosure requirements should meet
three criteria which require the drawing of essentially arbitrary lines
in determining what must be disclosed. First, information should not
be required unless it can be anticipated that the vast majority of com-
panies can supply such information with a reasonable degree of relia-
bility. It would otherwise be unfair to subject companies to the liabilities
of deficient information. For example, it would be unfair to require
a disclosure in all cases on matters which are highly subjective (e.g.,
the relative skill of management), or where hard data may be unavail-
able to the company (e.g., its share of the overall market).
Second, legal requirements in any field should be articulated with
a reasonable degree of specificity, and the degree should increase as
the consequences of breach increase in seriousness. Even now, the
mandatory requirements, as reflected in the official forms as well as
supplemental guides, are rather vague in their present form. In view
of the very severe civil and criminal sanctions for violating SEC filing
requirements, a high order of clarity about these requirements is
appropriate."
Third, very specific disclosure requirements would not serve the
public interest if they required information which would merely clutter
the majority of filings with irrelevant and confusing detail, in order
to catch an occasional material disclosure in an isolated situation.
In view of these considerations, there are practical as well as policy
limitations on the extent to which disclosures of soft information can
be made mandatory for all companies subject to a particular filing
requirement. In contrast, to the extent soft disclosures are made per-
missive, there will be no need to specify precise topics for disclosure
53 The Staff has shown some tendency to overuse the half-truth approach. On
occasion it requests additional disclosures which either fit within exceptions to the stated
disclosure requirements (created either expressly or more often by negative inference),
or which have no apparent relationship to statements otherwise made or required to be
made in a filing. For example, Instruction 1 to Item 17 of Form S-1, relating to manage-
ment remuneration, dearly indicates that no information about compensation of an
officer need be given for any portion of the year specified during which such person was
not an officer. A recent comment letter in the author's experience, however, expressly
requested information on an individual's remuneration for a period of time after his bona
fide resignation as an officer. See also the discussion of the Franchard case, note 91 infra
& accompanying text.
64 But see United States v. Pope, 189 F. Supp. 12, 20-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) which held
that the requirements of Form S-1 were not unconstitutionally void for vagueness for
failure to define the terms "transactions," "party," "interest," and "material."
1972]
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since, by hypothesis, disclosure will be made at the company's election.
Different policy questions arise, however, in connection with per-
missive disclosures, such as whether the information is relevant,
material, reliable to an acceptable degree, and adequately qualified so
that investors appreciate its soft character.
Accordingly, there should be a different standard for mandatory
and permissive disclosure in evolving a new approach to soft informa-
tion. 5 As in the past, disclosure should be mandatory, and adverse
consequences should attach to nondisclosure, only if the information
is fairly specific, objective, and negative in character."e But soft dis-
closure should be permissive on a broader basis, so long as it meets
the other standards discussed herein. The result may be some uneven-
ness in disclosure, in that soft information may be permitted, and
consequently included, in filings where it is favorable, but equivalent
information may not be required, and therefore may not be included,
if it is unfavorable. Nevertheless, on balance the results would appear to
be desirable, if the net result would be to give investors additional,
useful information.
Such a development would not be a major departure from generally
prevailing practice. Even today, companies have broad discretion in
selecting information to be included in their filings, beyond the manda-
tory material. Quite commonly in fact, once a company has made the
55 The Franchard case, discussed in note 91 infra, illustrates an application of this
double standard. Unquestionably the prospectus might have stressed the company's unique
dependence on its founder, but its failure to do so was not alleged as a deficiency.
56 See Prettner v. Aston, 339 F. Supp. 273 (D. Del. 1972) (no need to speculate
about adverse labor developments which might result from an acquisition).
"Negative" may be judged in part from the point of view of the party creating the
disclosure document. In the context of a conventional prospectus which is directed
toward prospective purchasers of an issuer's securities, "negative" information is informa-
tion that reflects adversely on the issuer. In the context of an exchange offer or tender
document originated by a party attempting to purchase securities of an issuer, "negative"
information in this sense would be information that reflects favorably on the value of
the securities sought to be acquired. In point of fact, many anti-fraud cases dealing with
the adequacy of disclosure involved parties attempting to acquire securities who sup-
pressed information which reflected favorably on the investment value of the securities
sought to be acquired-e.g., Felt v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp.
544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (non-disclosure of the amount of "surplus surplus" of an insurance
company sought to be acquired); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66
(E.D.N.Y. 1969) (non-disclosure of the fact that assets of the target company had a
market value substantially in excess of its book value, and that the purchaser of the
securities intended to realize the market value through liquidation); Speed v. Trans-
america Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951) (same), aff'd, 235 F.2d 369, 373 (3d Cir.
1956).
If a company is using a registration statement to offer recision to existing stock-
holders, theoretically those offerees may be unfairly induced to sell their shares if the
company is presented in an overly negative light. Perplexing and subtle problems arise
when a speculative company in the process of making its first public offering discovers
that it must make a concurrent registered recision offer to existing shareholders who have
purchased their shares in transactions violating § 5 of the 1933 Act. Typically, the issuer
will use essentially the same prospectus for both the new offering and the recision offering,
possibly with an alternate cover page. If the prospectus follows the usual negative ap-
proach, the issuer might well be defrauding the recision offerees.
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minimum mandatory disclosures, it puts its "best foot" forward and
develops new areas of information in a filing only if the information
is reasonably favorable. Of course, as is currently the case, the prohibi-
tion against half-truths provides the SEC and the courts with a highly
flexible means 7 to prevent the suppression of truly significant adverse
soft information. Additionally the natural restraints on inclusion of any
soft information (for example, the desire to avoid liability) should dis-
courage the excessive use of soft information, even if it is favorable
and permissive. In the last analysis, the different standards for permis-
sive and mandatory disclosure suggested herein should result in more
balanced information than we have today.
B. Avoiding Retroactive Applications
The SEC and the courts should avoid the potential inequities of
retroactive application of new standards. Many of the changes suggested
herein can evolve through interpretation and a shift in approach, with-
out the need for clear-cut revisions in the specific requirements of
disclosure forms. If the adequacy of a filing must be judged, the de-
termination should be made in accordance with the standards prevailing
at the time of the filing, not more sophisticated standards developed in
the interim.s
There are various means to avoid retroactivity. The SEC has broad
discretion in determining when to commence administrative or civil
court proceedings, and in referring cases for criminal prosecution.
Furthermore, courts have broad discretion in granting injunctive re-
57 The half-truth approach can be a useful means to an end, once it is decided that
disclosure should be compelled. However, it must be recognized that the Commission
and the courts have adopted varying standards, depending on the circumstances and
subject matter, in determining whether a statement is materially incomplete. A very
expansive application of the half-truth prohibition is illustrated by the Franchard case,
discussed in note 91 infra, where the mere mention of a man's name constituted a half-
truth without disclosure of further information bearing on his integrity. By contrast,
the half-truth approach is virtually ignored when no objection is made to the typical
prospectus statement that the offering price was determined "by negotiation," with no
indication of the basis of the negotiation. This point is discussed at text accompanying
note 91 infra. The half-truth analysis is also given very limited application in connection
with use-of-proceeds disclosures.
58For example, as investor interest grew in environmental and civil rights issues,
a new disclosure policy emerged without any change in the filing forms. SEC Securities
Act Release No. 9252 (July 19, 1971). Arguably the policy merely codified the pre-
existing obligation of full disclosure. However, it is suggested that any judgment con-
cerning the adequacy of a filing regarding environmental matters (e.g., in applying the
half-truth or materiality tests), should give due recognition to the change in the standard
of required disclosure occasioned by the publication of the policy. Likewise, the new
disclosure requirement relating to compensating balance arrangements which is ap-
parently emerging, see note 19 supra, should not be given retroactive application.
The Commission itself has, on occasion, promulgated interpretations of existing
requirements on a prospective basis, in order that the interpretation may be assimilated
without undue hardship as to completed or pending transactions. SEC Accounting
Series Release No. 130 (Sept. 29, 1972) (dealing with pooling-of-interests accounting).
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lief.59 Even in the context of a civil damage suit, in applying the tests
of materiality and reliance, and in determining whether a statement was
a misleading half-truth, courts should consider disclosure standards
prevailing at the time a statement was made in determining what degree
of disclosure an investor was entitled to expect.6 0
C. Different Treatment for Affirmative and Negative Information
There is some policy justification for a disclosure standard oriented
primarily toward protecting investors against purchasing or holding
securities which are worse than the investors think (and against selling
securities which are better than they think). Relatively speaking, it
seems less important to protect them against missing favorable oppor-
tunities. In dealing with mandatory (as contrasted with permissive)
disclosures, there should continue to be a greater obligation to make
disclosure if the information is negative than if the information is affir-
mative, other things being equal.
SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS
Having reviewed various general considerations, let us consider
certain specific areas in which there should be a reappraisal of the tradi-
tional views regarding soft information. Broad categories of information
will be identified where relaxation of the traditional exclusionary rules
seems indicated, but in most instances no attempt will be made to suggest
the precise quantum of change.
V. PLANS AND EXPECTATIONS
Investment decisions cannot be made as of a prior date. The past
is prologue. Disclosure documents containing historical data are useful
(if at all) primarily as a means of helping investors evaluate future
prospects. Nevertheless, filings have traditionally excluded a vast res-
ervoir of information which is highly relevant in predicting future
developments-namely, the plans and expectations of the company's
management. In the normal course of business, management prepares
budgets and makes projections concerning financial results such as sales,
expenses, and profits. In addition, management often develops or has
59 See, e.g., SEC v. Harwyn Indus. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (finding
a violation but denying preliminary injunction sought by SEC because of uncertainty in
law prevailing at time of activity in question).
60 Cf. Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 464
F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1972). The industry turmoil which can result from a retroactive
change in prevailing standards is illustrated by the difficulty which the court had in
formulating its final opinion in Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., Inc., 438 F.2d 1167
(2d Cir. 1971).
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available many other types of forward-looking information, not relating
specifically to financial results, regarding such matters as (1) plans for
its products, marketing program, methods of financing, personnel, or
general business strategy; (2) plans for the expansion, contraction, or
redirection of the business; (3) plans for acquisitions of other compa-
nies, which may or may not have been specifically identified; or (4)
plans involving the disposal of existing assets, which may include a
reasonable expectation that the assets will yield proceeds far above (or
below) the carrying value on the company's books.
Considering the critical importance to investors of information
bearing on future developments, a balance of policy considerations dic-
tates an increase in forward-looking or predictive information in filings
concerning the reasonable expectations of management, and the basis
therefor. A good business executive normally has some firm expectations
about the immediate future of his company. To the extent that uncer-
tainties exist, he should be able to pinpoint the major contingencies
which could affect the future and estimate the probabilities of various
possible results. Experience with annual reports and other non-filed
communications from companies to investors indicates that manage-
ments are capable of generating a good deal of reliable forward-looking
information. Indeed, if a company's management did not have some
fairly definite and well-based expectations about the future, that fact
itself would be important for investors to know.
There are, however, two considerations militating against disclosure
of plans and expectations. While these factors should be considered in
tailoring the specifics of a new disclosure approach, they are not so
significant that the status quo should be retained. First, there is the risk
that managements will feel pressure to make business decisions which
will result in the fulfillment of earlier predictions, even though different
decisions would appear to be more appropriate. However, the very fact
that his company becomes publicly owned may tend to restrict manage-
ment alternatives. Managements now make predictions through non-
filed means, and any additional pressure to fulfill a prediction because
it is contained in a filing is only a marginal consideration.6'
(1 Generally, the management of a well-run company does not make day-to-day
decisions with regard to anticipated impact on the market price of its securities. How-
ever, a company does have some legitimate interest in the market price for its securities,
for example, if it is making acquisitions for its securities. There may be certain types of
management decisions--such as the strategy to adopt in a labor negotiation when a
strike is threatened-where the impact on the market price for company stock could
be a proper consideration.
"In August 1969, when an Arthur Andersen audit showed Four Seasons hadn't
reached its earnings projections, [two Company officials] allegedly manufactured millions
of dollars of false and nonexistent construction costs. The indictment said Arthur Ander-
sen ... overlooked the falsity of the costs and certified Four Seasons financial state-
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Second, mandatory disclosure about future plans may put a com-
pany at a disadvantage vis-h-vis its competitors. The frequently heard
complaint that disclosure will adversely affect a company's competitive
position is often exaggerated. The author has known of few if any in-
stances where significant adverse developments resulted from dis-
closure, despite dire predictions to the contrary. However, such a result
may be more likely to occur when a company must disclose its future
plans, strategies or expectations, as contrasted with historical data.
Many companies now find that a public financing cannot proceed when
critical developments are in progress and adequate disclosure is impos-
sible or inappropriate. For example, an offering is frequently deferred
until a pending material acquisition is either completed or abandoned.
Unfortunate though this may be to the particular company, it is a
necessary consequence of our disclosure system. The possibility of some
competitive disadvantage in isolated cases is not a factor which should
preclude all mandatory disclosures about future plans.
Occasionally the Staff's hostility to soft information concerning the
future prevents investors from learning information that may be very
useful in evaluating a company's future. Staff comments are often de-
signed to focus the prospectus reader's attention primarily, if not ex-
clusively, on where the company has been, and not where management
hopes to take it. Even if all of the risks and contingencies are adequately
disclosed, the Staff tends to object in principle to lengthy discussions
about the future. The attitude seems to be: just tell us where you have
been, not where you expect to go.
62
Comment letters occasionally request deletion of a statement be-
cause it contains an "implied prediction," without offering any further
basis for the request, apparently relying on the unstated premise that
everyone knows prospectuses should be untainted by predictions, im-
ments based on the false data, knowing they were false." Wall St. J., Dec. 21, 1972,
at 3, col. 2.
62 The point can be illustrated by the author's experience with a prospectus of a
company which historically had manufactured specific products for a rather narrow
market. The prospectus indicated the company's plans to concentrate marketing efforts
toward a different type of customer for the same product (an effort in which it had
already achieved some success), to use its technology in designing similar products for
totally different markets (an activity to which considerable marketing effort had already
been directed with some significant indication of potential customers, although no sales),
and to develop a completely new product line (which had already gone through an ex-
tensive pre-production phase). With each reference to these future plans, there was a
disclaimer indicating that success was not assured. A very substantial portion of the
proceeds were being allocated to these new activities. The comment letter made various
requests to delete or condense discussions of the company's future plans. The comments
were directed at material which accounted for approximately three pages of a 49 page
prospectus. The objection was not directed to the absence of warnings concerning the
risk. Rather, it was an objection in principle to the amount of text devoted to the
company's future plans, as contrasted with its history. The matter was finally resolved
on a satisfactory basis after discussion with the Staff, but the incident is illustrative of
the Staff's instinctive bias.
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plied or otherwise. If a statement meets appropriate standards discussed
herein, however, it should not be considered objectionable per se be-
cause of its predictive character.
When management has a strategy for the future, it should be free
to explain fully its "game plan" and to give its realistic analysis of the
probabilities and contingencies for its success. If it plans to redirect the
company's activities, information bearing on the risk/reward potential
of the future program can be more relevant to a new investor than
would be a discussion of the past. Of course, discussions of future plans
should be qualified to point out the risks and uncertainties.
There should be no objection in principle if optimistic overtones
color management's analysis of its forward-looking program. Investors
should expect management to have favorable attitudes toward its own
program. It is preferable to give the public a realistic indication of
management's favorable view, trusting the investor to discount the
information appropriately, rather than to end every discussion with the
boilerplate (and essentially useless) reminder that "there is no assur-
ance of" the world's continued existence.
A. General Principles
In reshaping attitudes and approaches toward predictive state-
ments, certain general principles, applied on a common sense basis,
should provide investors with more useful data.
1. Reasonable Basis for Predictions
Predictions should have a reasonable basis and should represent
the honest good faith expectation of the party making them.'
2. Disclosure of Assumptions
To the extent practicable, the major assumptions and bases under-
lying predictions should be articulated, especially if they involve a sig-
nificant departure from the status quo. If a prediction is based primarily
on the subjective judgment of management, rather than on objective
data, investors should be so advised. Once investors know the basis for a
prediction, they should be able to assign an appropriate credibility
factor to the prediction.
The company should be prepared as well to support the reason-
63 It is often said in the related context of broker-dealer disciplinary proceedings,
that the predictions should have a reasonable "factual" basis. It is suggested that the
need for a "factual" basis be deemphasized, to the extent that the term "factual"
implies that there must be hard, objective data from which others could deduce the
same conclusion. In point of fact, major business decisions often are made on the basis
of the judgment or intuition of experienced executives who do not have hard evidence
at hand.
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ableness of the assumptions underlying its predictions. However, the
burden imposed on the company should be relatively higher when the
company has a unique ability to justify or evaluate an assumption, and
should be relatively lower when the assumption relates to a matter of
general knowledge. Thus, if a company bases its prediction upon the
assumption that prime interest rates will rise (or fall) sharply within
the next year, investors generally are able to evaluate the soundness of
that assumption. It should be sufficient for the company to show that
its view was held by a respectable number of authorities, without im-
posing upon the company the need to develop a basic economic analy-
sis on projected interest rates. Alternatively, the burden on the com-
pany to justify its assumptions should be greater if, for example, the
assumption underlying the prediction is that the company's products
will comply with highly technical specifications.
3. Capability of Achievement
Statements of future plans should be limited to those plans that the
company is reasonably capable of achieving within a reasonable time
period.6" For example, if the company has virtually completed a re-
search and development program on a new product, and it is reason-
ably convinced that the product will be commercially successful, it
would be justified in discussing its plans for the introduction of that
product. By contrast, if the company is just beginning a long term re-
search and development program, with the ultimate outcome still largely
speculative, it would be inappropriate to discuss a present "plan" to
introduce the product. The company might, however, appropriately dis-
cuss the nature of its research and development program.
4. Commitment
A plan should not be discussed unless the company has substan-
tially committed itself to the particular course of action. If a plan is of
the type that requires approval by the board of directors, it should be
discussed in a filing only after the board has approved it and undertaken
the commitments, such as funding, necessary for its implementation3 5
04 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4936, i9 52 (Dec. 9, 1968): "Unless there is
reasonable assurance that the securities to be offered will be acceptable to a securities
exchange for listing, the prospectus may be misleading if it conveys the impression that
the registrant may apply for listing of the securities on an exchange or that the under-
writers may request the registrant to apply for such listing."
65 This principle has been established in cases dealing with the question whether
plans are sufficiently definite to require disclosure. See, e.g., Allen v. H.K. Porter Co.,
452 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1971) (plan to refinance a target company too indefinite to
require disclosure); Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan American Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075
(5th Cir. 1970) (plan to merge company too indefinite to require disclosure); James
Blackstone Memorial Library Ass'n v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 264 F.2d 445 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 815 (1959) (plan to sell assets too indefinite to require disclosure);
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Such commitments need not be absolute; where they are subject to con-
tingencies, such contingencies should be disclosed in the filing.
5. Disclosure of Predictive Character
Predictive statements should be cast in terms of management's
"present plans," "present expectations," or a similar verbal formula
which will make clear to investors the predictive nature of the state-
ments. Statements of what the company "will" do should be used only
when there is a high degree of assurance that the company can and
affirmatively intends to accomplish the particular result.66
6. Estimate of Probabilities
Companies should indicate some realistic estimate of the prob-
abilities of success. The statement should be cast in general qualitative
terms, rather than specific quantitative terms unless a firm basis exists
for a higher degree of precision. It may be useful to remind investors
that there is no assurance concerning the realization of a prediction,
but a pro forma disclaimer of assurance, without more, attached to the
end of every predictive statement, is not as useful to investors as man-
agement's realistic appraisal of the probabilities.
7. Accuracy of Prior Predictions
Whenever possible, filings should disclose management's prior
prediction record. Especially when further predictions are to be made
on the same subject, a comparison should be made between the actual
results achieved and earlier predictions of those results. Of course, if
past predictions have proven to be inaccurate, management should be
permitted (and possibly required) to explain its view of what caused the
discrepancy.
Whenever management is called to account for its forecasts, the
adequacy of any prediction should be determined in light of the in-
formation known or reasonably available to the person making the pre-
diction at the time it was made. 7 The fact that a prediction turns out
SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (same). The issue is
typically framed in terms of whether or not the undisclosed information was "material."
See Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmutz, 464 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1972).
In SEC v. Shapiro, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f[ 93,623 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 28, 1972),
the defendants were held to have violated the anti-fraud rules by their purchase of
stock while a merger negotiation was pending but before the facts were publicly dis-
closed. The court held that the information regarding the negotiations were material
facts and that the defendants' purchases constituted a violation of the anti-fraud rules
even though the merger did not ultimately take place. At the time of the defendants'
purchases, "the proposed merger could be considered a viable possibility." Id. at 92,850.
6 6 See 1933 Act Rule 407(c), 17 C.F.R. § 230.407(c) (1971).
67 Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 464 F.2d
437 (2d Cir. 1972); Republic Technology Fund, Inc. v. Lionel Corp., 345 F. Supp. 656
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to be inaccurate should not, of itself, indicate that it was improperly
made, although subsequent development may have a bearing in de-
termining what information was or should have been known at the time
of the prediction. Nor should the fact that a prediction is fulfilled neces-
sarily indicate that it was reasonably based-an unwarranted prediction
of a market price increase may be realized, for example, precisely be-
cause a manipulative scheme succeeded0
B. Financial Projections, Budgets, and Appraisals
Projections and forecasts of financial results-such as budgets or
projections of revenues, expenses, and earnings-are a special category
of forward-looking information highly relevant to investors. Indeed,
expected earnings per share in the immediate future is among the most
significant factors influencing securities prices and, consequently, in-
vestment decisions. Projections of this nature are widely used in the
financial community, and the existence of an earnings projection has
been considered as a material fact in applying the anti-fraud provi-
sions.69 Investors generally are aware, from common experience, that
forecasting is not a particularly accurate technique, and that errors
are most often on the optimistic side. Investors are in a position to
weigh the credibility of forecasts. The possibility that a particular
investor may attach too great a significance to a forecast certainly does
not justify keeping this whole category of information out of all filings.
The extent to which financial projections should be included in
filings presents an extremely difficult and specialized subject about
which a considerable body of opinion has developed. 70 However, al-
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (interim unaudited financial statements prepared on basis of facts
known at the time were not deficient, although subsequent year-end adjustments were
made).
68 Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1961); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
69 SEC v. Lum's, Inc. (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 9, 1972) (consent injunction), reported in
177 BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. A-8 (Nov. 15, 1972); SEC v. Glen Alden Corp., [1967-
1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. f1 92,280 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8459 (Nov. 25,
1968), in [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FE. SEc. L. REp. ff 77,629. For cases
holding inadequately-based projections actionable, see Sprayregen v. Livingston Oil Co.,
295 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Taylor v. Janigan, 212 F. Supp. 794 (D. Mass.
1962); SEC v. F.S. Johns & Co., 207 F. Supp. 566 (D.N.J. 1962). Investors tend to
give undue emphasis to reported earnings as a measurement of value. It might be
argued that wider use of earnings projections in disclosure documents is undesirable
simply because it will focus greater attention on them.7on SEC proceedings on hot issues numerous witnesses discussed forecasts; see
SEC, In the Matter of Hot Issues Securities Markets, Ad. File No. 4-148 (Mar. 22, 1972)
[hereinafter cited as Hot Issues]. Also, the Commission has recently held hearings
relating to the use of estimates, forecasts, and projections in filings. See SEC Exchange
Act Release No. 9844 (Nov. 1, 1972). In Rieling & Burton, Financial Statements: Sign-
posts as Well as Milestones, HARv. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1972, at 44, the traditional
arguments against forecasts in filings are balanced against competing considerations, and
the authors conclude that forecasts should be included in filings. Significantly one of the
co-authors of the article is presently the Chief Accountant of the SEC, although the
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though views on the specifics vary widely, a consensus may be form-
ing that at least some types of financial projections should be allowed
in certain filings.71 A detailed analysis of such considerations is beyond
the scope of this Article. However, the following principles are offered
as a practical guideline for the increased disclosure of soft information.
Although in some instances these guidelines restate the general princi-
ples given above for dealing with any predictive statement, there are
added factors in financial projections that require a separate analysis.
1. Financial projections should be includible in filings only if
there is a reasonable basis for the projections.72 Generally, the pro-
jection should be based on past performance or other hard data, such
as an existing backlog of orders for the company's products. If a start-up
company has not yet developed a commercially salable product, nor-
mally it should not be permitted to project a full income statement,
since there would be no basis for projecting any specific level of sales.
Projections even for an active operating company should normally be
confined to a reasonably short term period-the balance of the current
fiscal year plus one additional year, for example.
2. Generally the inclusion of projections should be optional with
the issuer. Projections should be mandatory only in very narrowly
defined circumstances where they can be prepared with a relatively
high degree of certainty.73
article was largely developed before he assumed that position and there is the usual
disclaimer that the article expresses neither his nor the SEC's official view. See also
Kripke, supra note 10; Prospectuses, supra note 10. For a discussion of the experience
in England, where company-originated forecasts are widely used, see Grieves, English
Profit Forecasts, 5 REv. SEc. REG. 919 (1972); Damant, A Note on Practice In the
United Kingdom-Financial Forecasting by Companies, 28 FjNAxNar ANALnsrs J., Sept.-
Oct. 1972, at 44.
7 1 See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra, discussing the Commission's hot issue
proposal on budgets.
72 The Commission's hot issue proposal to require disclosure of "a budget of antici-
pated cash expenditures and resources . . . ," see note 28 supra, probably uses the term
"budget" to mean this kind of reasonable projection. However, the term may also con-
note a management tool prepared for internal purposes on a basis not necessarily
reflecting management's best estimates of likely results. For example, the budget may be
prepared as a goal representing the best possible results which management can reasonably
hope to achieve. A management budget may not be internally consistent, although the
inconsistencies may not necessarily be apparent to those who prepare the budget. For
example, the budget may include a substantial sales increase but may allocate the same
expenses to the department handling raw materials, without focusing on the fact that a
substantial sales increase would increase indirect costs in the materials handling depart-
ment.
In order to avoid confusion with such internal budgets, it is suggested that any
SEC requirements for forward-looking financial information be expressed in terms of a
"forecast," a "projection" or some other term that clearly implies management's best
estimates of likely results unless, as some commentators have suggested, the requirement
is actually intended to disclose management's goal. See, e.g., statement of Harvey
Kapnick, Chairman of Arthur Andersen & Company, Hot Issues, supra note 70, at 4-5.
In the latter event, however, the disclosure should be clearly qualified so that the investor
can distinguish the budget from a forecast of most likely results which may be (but
need not necessarily be) quite different.
73 For example, if an investment relates solely to interests in a building which is
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3. The major assumptions underlying the projection should be
set forth, but it should not be necessary to detail pages of specific as-
sumptions, especially if they relate to the reasonably based expectation
that the status quo will continue. Furthermore, when it is possible to
do so, the issuer should try to evaluate the extent to which a deviation
from the assumed fact can affect the projected results, since even a
minor variation in one assumption may have a major impact on the
projected results, and vice versa.
4. To the extent practicable, auditors or other experts should
expertize, or at least give negative comfort on,74 the arithmetic cal-
culations as well as the adequacy and consistency of the accounting
principles used in formulating the projection.75 However, the experts
should not be required to pass affirmatively on the soundness of the
assumptions. To do so would very likely take them beyond the area of
their expertise, might well involve undue expense, and could con-
ceivably taint their independence when they later audit the period
covered by an earlier projection.
5. There are cases where it would be wise to permit (or require)
projections of only certain income or expense items, instead of a full
income statement. For a start-up enterprise still in a development phase,
without commercially salable products, it might be most realistic to
project certain expenses (for example, those which are fixed and not
dependent on sales) over the next year, without projecting any level of
revenue.76 By contrast, a well-established utility may find it easier to
project revenues than to project expenses or profits, since the demand
for service and the rates to be received may be relatively more certain
than the level of expenses and the resulting net profits.77 In other cases,
occupied under a long term net lease by a triple-A tenant, it might be appropriate to
require a financial projection based upon the stated assumption that the tenant will
fully perform its obligations. Cf. Form S-11, Item 6(b). Tax shelter investments are
another category where certain types of mandatory projections-for example, concerning
cash flows or tax effects-may be justified.
74 An auditor giving "negative comfort" would state that he has no reason to believe
the projection is inaccurate in its arithmetic calculations, consistency of accounting treat-
ment, or in other aspects for which comfort is being given.
7 5 An argument has been made against such limited expertizing, on the grounds that
forecasts probably depend about 95% on the assumptions and only 5% on accounting
methods and arithmetic used in compilation. It has been suggested that any association
of an auditor with a forecast is likely to imply more than a 5% responsibility, and that
auditors will not be able effectively to avoid responsibility for the assumptions. Hot
Issues, supra note 70, at 12.
At least two new firms have been organized to function as independent experts in
verifying the reasonableness of financial forecasts and the assumptions underlying them.
Schellhardt, SEC Pressure to Include Projections in Prospectuses Inspires New Firms,
Wall St. J., June 9, 1972, at 6, cols. 3-4.
76The Commission requires a projection of first-year expenses to be included on
Form BD by a new broker-dealer. 1934 Act Rule 15bl-2(c) (3), 37 Fed. Reg. 9669 (1972)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15bl-2 (c) (3) ).
77 See WHEAT REPoaT, supra note 2, at 134-35.
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the best course would be to frame projections in terms of the relation-
ships among specific variables-for example, to project the levels of
unit sales necessary to cover overhead at various unit sale prices-in-
stead of showing a total income statement.
6. Issuers should be permitted to state their projections of reason-
able expectations. A presentation in terms of a range is particularly
helpful for a company with relatively high fixed cost and low marginal
cost, since it will show the change in the profit-to-sales ratio as sales
increase or decrease.
7. In judging the adequacy of a projection for purposes of deter-
mining liability, the key issues should be whether it correctly stated the
good faith view of management and whether it was reasonably based,
not whether it proved to be an accurate prophesy. While developments
subsequent to the date of the forecast may be relevant, indicating
what management knew or should have known, the reasonableness of
the forecast should be determined in the light only of such information
as was known or reasonably available to management at the time of the
forecast.
7
8. Appraisals based on current fair market value, as contrasted
with values based on historical costs, present another type of financial
forecast. The extent to which fair market values should be disclosed
in addition to (or in lieu of) historical cost data is an extremely
complex subject beyond the scope of this Article.79 However, it is
clear that in at least some circumstances-for example, where there
is a definite plan to sell assets at a price reasonably anticipated to
differ substantially from historical cost-disclosure of current values
is appropriate and in many cases should be mandatory.80
VI. USE OF PROCEEDS
The use-of-proceeds section of a prospectus represents one of the
few areas where soft information has not only been permitted, but to
7 8 See Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 464
F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1972).
7 9 For a discussion of the disclosure of fair market values, see Myths, supra note 10,
at 1188.
80E.g., SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Gerstle
v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,
99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), aff'd, 235 F.2d 369, 373 (3d Cir. 1956). In Kohn v.
American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 120
(1972), a proxy statement was held to be materially deficient because it omitted to
explain the basis of the valuation of the assets which American Metal Climax acquired
from Roan Selection Trust.
For a case alleging violation of the anti-fraud rules for failure to state appraised
values, see Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969)
(reversing summary judgment for defendants), on remand, 328 F. Supp. 797 (S.D. In.
1971) (judgment on the merits for defendants for failure to prove injury, reliance, or
causation).
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some extent required, since the subject under discussion is the com-
pany's financial plans for the future. Even in this area, however, the
traditional policies regarding soft information have kept available infor-
mation of a highly probative nature out of the prospectus.
To illustrate, assume that a company proposes to spend a million
dollars on a plant and equipment to produce a new product. A dis-
closure of this fact would be required in a prospectus under current
standards. Assume further that management makes the following three
projections about annual sales of the new product: (a) the company
will not be able to cover direct manufacturing costs of the new product
unless sales reach 8,000 units; (b) the new operation will not absorb
overhead and break even, unless unit sales exceed 13,000; and (c) man-
agement projects sales of 25,000. All three of these projections, as
well as the unit sales price used in making them, would be highly
informative in making investment decisions-to the professional analyst
familiar with the industry, if not to all lay investors. Indeed, if a com-
pany incurring such capital expenditures did not have projections of
this general nature, that fact in itself would be highly relevant to
investors. The three projections could be most useful in estimating the
likelihood and extent of success of the new venture, and in generally
evaluating the risk/reward potential of the company's financial plan.
A use-of-proceeds section making disclosures of the type suggested
by the three projections above would be very rare indeed. Investors
typically receive raw data about dollar allocations, but very little
information concerning the underlying economic realities necessary
to appraise the financial plan. The investor can be misled, of course, by
tenuous projections. The hypothetical company should not be able to
disclose a five-year profit projection for the new plant. But as was
shown in the discussion of analogous problems in the disclosure of
forward-looking information, the application of practical guidelines in
this area can reduce the risk of abuse, and justifies further relaxation
of the strictures surrounding the use-of-proceeds section. Another
constructive approach can be seen in the Commission's hot issue pro-
posal.8 '
81 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5276, at 7-8 (July 26, 1972), proposes a new
instruction with additional disclosures for first-time registrants that have not conducted
operations for a period of three years. The registrant is required to disclose its plan of
operations for the immediate future, including further details on its intended use of
proceeds. See note 26 supra & accompanying text.
However, as was the case with the other hot issue proposals, this proposal is oriented
toward high-risk start-up ventures which are exposed to the risk of running out of money
shortly after the offering. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5276, at 1-3 (July 26, 1972).
The Commission has not made a corresponding proposal to require (or even permit) well-
established companies to develop similar forward-looking disclosures of their plans for
future operations.
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There are two specific aspects in which use-of-proceeds sections
can be improved in relation to soft disclosures. The first concerns the
pressure for an unwarranted degree of certainty with respect to alloca-
tions of funds. The second concerns the artificiality inherent in assigning
dollars from specific sources to particular projects.
A. The Pressure for Certainty
The Staff's comments frequently request registrants to harden
disclosures in the use-of-proceeds section, thereby making them unjus-
tifiably specific and detailed. The public can be misled when filings
suggest that plans and future programs are more definite than in
fact they are. 2 If plans are still fluid or uncertain, any express or
implied representations to the contrary are inaccurate.
Typically a small company going public has a great deal of
difficulty in stating with assurance precisely what it will do with the
proceeds of an offering. The use-of-proceeds section often covers al-
locations that may take many months or even years to complete, with
certain expenditures necessarily contingent on intervening developments
or delayed until other expenditures are completed. It may be extremely
difficult for management of a small, chronically undercapitalized com-
pany to predict long in advance what the most propitious application
of funds will be at a future date. Even a well-managed company may
change the allocation of the proceeds many times in the course of
preparing a prospectus. After the broad categories have been established,
the numbers tend to remain fluid until the final effective date. One fre-
quently feels that if the filing were delayed for another draft, the use-
of-proceeds section would be revised still further, with the final version
being somewhat arbitrary. Issuers typically reflect these uncertainties
by including reservations or hedge clauses in their use-of-proceeds
sections to preserve flexibility-for example, by leaving portions of the
proceeds uncommitted, by describing allocations in a very general
way, or by reserving the right to reallocate in the light of future
developments. The Staff comments, however, frequently request more
definite and specific commitments.
Often, after the offering, management decides that it is in the com-
pany's best interest to expend a portion of the proceeds differently than
indicated in the prospectus (even if the difference represents only
a shift of funds among various stated purposes). Indeed, it is estimated
that close to half of the companies making a first public offering use
at least some portion of the proceeds in a way not anticipated when
82See Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d
Cir. 1969); Trainor v. Berner, 334 F. Supp. 1143 (S.M.N.Y. 1971).
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the prospectus was written. 3 It is not unusual that a project outlined
in a prospectus no longer has a high priority in relation to other current
needs for funds, or no longer seems meritorious. For example, if funds
were allocated to research, development, and marketing for a new
product, and it appears after half of the funds are spent that the
product will not succeed, management should not (and normally does
not) feel constrained to expend the other half on that product. Some-
times the company desires to complete a particular project stated in
a prospectus, but finds other means of financing without using the
proceeds of the offering. If a company can arrange better terms to lease
capital equipment, or to finance a purchase on a long term basis, it
should not feel compelled to buy the equipment for cash, simply be-
cause the prospectus allocated funds for such a purchase.
The problem of undue certainty is focused by the relatively new
form S-R (applicable to first-time registrants), which requires the is-
suers to file a follow-up report on its actual application of the proceeds.
Unless the company can retain reasonable flexibility in the prospectus,
this new form may have a chilling effect on management's initiative.
Faced with this requirement, management may feel itself under great
pressure to follow the use of proceeds stated in the prospectus, notwith-
standing the fact that a bona fide business judgment would dictate a
more advantageous use of the funds at the time an expenditure is
scheduled to be made.
It has been suggested that more specificity in the use-of-proceeds
section of prospectuses is desirable. A countervailing consideration must,
however, be recognized. At the time a prospectus is being written, man-
agement should not have to pretend that the use-of-proceeds plan is
more specific than it really is. Nor should it be bound to follow a
stated plan which no longer makes business sense, any more than it
should be bound by an internal annual budget which typically under-
goes revisions throughout the year. The use-of-proceeds section should
do no more than state management's good faith intention at the time
the prospectus becomes effective. It should not be viewed as a contrac-
tual commitment to new investors that their funds must be spent only
as stated, especially when the issuer has a bona fide business reason
to depart from the plan. This flexible approach has in fact been the
83 1n some such cases, however, there is no inconsistency between the actual
use of proceeds and the language in the prospectus. The prospectus may be expressed in
much more general terms than the company's specific plans. Thus, if the prospectus
allocated funds to equipment purchases (or opening of sales offices), funds may be spent
for such general purpose, although the specific items of equipment purchased (or offices
opened) differed from those anticipated when the prospectus was prepared.
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prevailing interpretation of a use-of-proceeds section,"4 and it should
remain so.
The argument that the SEC should require more specificity, and
greater adherence to use-of-proceeds sections, to protect the supposed
expectations of investors that the proceeds will be used exactly as set
forth in the prospectus, overlooks a fundamental element in the invest-
ment decision. Presumably an investor who has purchased a company's
securities has confidence in its management. When a company must
decide whether to spend its funds either in the manner that management
currently thinks is best, or in the manner that management thought
would be best when the prospectus was written, it seems reasonable,
in light of the investor's confidence in management, to allow manage-
ment's current judgment to prevail.8 5
B. Artificiiy
There is an artificial or fictional aspect about many use-of-proceeds
presentations. The disclosure item assumes, to a large extent, that
specific dollars derived from the offering can be traced into specific
projects, which may stretch over a course of many years. In fact,
dollars derived from public financing are fungible economically with
dollars from other sources, such as retained earnings, borrowing, or
sale of other securities or assets. Even when funds from a given source
can be traced into a given bank account and out again to meet a
particular obligation, the identity of the specific dollars is more apparent
than real.
Quite often, the actual business plan is to combine proceeds of an
offering with proceeds from other sources in order to achieve a long
range financial goal. In such a situation, it would be realistic and
helpful to investors if the use-of-proceeds presentation was in the form
of a long range financial plan, rather than an arbitrary attempt to
trace specific dollars to particular uses-for example:
Over the next three years we propose to spend $100 on ex-
pansion, of which $50 is allocated to plant, $25 to equipment,
$15 to inventory, and $10 to increased working capital. We
propose to derive the funds from the following sources: $40
from the proceeds of the offering, $35 from long term mort-
gages, $15 from short term equipment financing, and $10 from
internally generated funds. Pending use of the proceeds for
84 See Lester v. Preco Indus., Inc., 282 F. Supp. 459 (S-D.N.Y. 1965).
85 These conclusions presume that management is acting in good faith and for the
benefit of the company.
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the foregoing purposes, they may be used for the temporary
reduction of short term indebtedness.
If the foregoing represents the company's plan in fact, it should
be presented to investors in the terms indicated, rather than pretend that
funds from specific sources can be traced to specific uses. There would
be, of course, a substantial amount of soft information contained in
such a presentation-the expectation that future financing will be avail-
able on acceptable terms (if the company does not have binding
stand-by commitments) and the implied prediction that it will generate
earnings of at least $10. To the extent that these sources of funds are
not absolutely assured, a hedge should be included to alert the investor
to the risk that the company may not be able to implement fully the
plan presented. Notwithstanding the potential hazards in this form of
presentation, however, investors would be far better informed by seeing
the entire expansion program in perspective.
VII. MANAGEMENT
An appraisal of management is of cardinal importance to investors
in making an investment decision, especially when dealing with small
or unseasoned companies lacking past performance records. Investors
would like to know about such factors as management's integrity,
ability, diligence in attending to the business, track record, and the
extent to which the company is dependent upon a particular individual
or group. However, there are inherent limitations on the ability of SEC
filings to convey this information. The dilemma has been recognized
by the Commission:
In many respects, the development of disclosure standards
adequate for informed appraisal of management's ability and
integrity is a difficult task. How do you tell a "good" business
manager from a "bad" one in a piece of paper? Managerial
talent consists of personal attributes, essentially subjective in
nature, that frequently defy meaningful analysis through the
impersonal medium of a prospectus. Direct statements of opin-
ion as to management's ability, which are not susceptible to
objective verification, may well create an unwarranted appear-
ance of reliability if placed in a prospectus. The integrity of
management-its willingness to place its duty to public share-
holders over personal interest-is an equally elusive factor
for the application of disclosure standardsOO
Let us consider some of the judgments which can be formed on
86Franchard Corp., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4710 (July 31, 1964), in [1964-
1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. Rp. fI 77,113, at 82,042 (citations omitted).
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the basis of a close working relationship; we will use four hypothetical
company managements as the basis for discussion.
The president of Company A is imaginative, energetic, thoroughly
conversant with his business and has the combination of guts, motiva-
tion, resourcefulness and greed that makes success likely. However,
he is not completely candid, and his egotism makes him so difficult to
work for that he has not been able to maintain a strong management
team, which may restrain the company's growth rate.
Company B is run by four brothers. Each has had extensive ex-
perience with every phase of the business and could hold almost any
position effectively, including the presidency. They have a mutually
satisfactory allocation of responsibility and work extremely well to-
gether.
Company C is run by three cousins. The president is fairly
competent. The treasurer, who can hardly count, and the secretary,
who can hardly read, are lazy, stupid, uninformed about the business,
and constantly bickering. Although the company continues to prosper
handsomely because of momentum, the management decisionmaking
process is near paralysis, and the company cannot meet changing
conditions efficiently.
The two poor boys who founded company D thirty years ago
succeeded by watching pennies and cutting costs in a highly competitive
business. But they are getting old and tired and will probably relax at
the helm after receiving one million dollars each from the proposed
secondary offering. Their sons, who are scheduled to take over more
management responsibility, are playboys who are jealous of each other,
and neither has the sharpness of his father.
An analyst studying each company firsthand would certainly
consider these impressions in reaching his evaluation-they might well
be critical to his final recommendation, and be included in a written
report. To the extent that the laws of defamation or the requirements
of good taste precluded specific details, he could use general qualita-
tive statements such as: management creates a very favorable (or
unfavorable) impression; it has (or lacks) depth; it appears well
suited (or unsuited) to meet changing conditions.
Counsel working on an SEC filing, however, rarely consider it
necessary, or even appropriate, for a company (acting of necessity
through its management) to appraise its own management along the
lines suggested. Soft information of such a highly subjective nature,
despite its relevance, is out of place in an SEC filing. If, on the other
hand, there is specific, objective information bearing materially on
management, such information is generally considered a proper subject
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for disclosure,"' and, if adverse, may well be a mandatory subject for
disclosure."8 Indeed, this is the trend shown in the Commission's pro-
posed expansion of disclosures in the management area, as part of its
hot issue controls.8 9
Beyond the general dichotomy between subjective and objective
information, very difficult judgments remain in determining when
information is sufficiently material or hard to permit or require dis-
closure. 0 The questions may be explored further by considering specific
attributes of management.
A. Integrity
Of all types of information dealing with management, the manda-
tory disclosure requirements are probably most rigorous, and disclosure
of soft information most necessary, when information reflects adversely
on management's integrity. If there is specific information which ma-
8 7 Disclosure is permissive, for example, if members of management have been singled
out for significant awards, or have held responsible trade association or government
positions related to their business.
8 8 Disclosure probably would be mandatory, for example, if the president of an
insurance company had just completed a five-year prison term for insurance fraud.
89 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5276 (July 26, 1972). The proposals call for
additional hard information concerning management personnel, such as their ages, and
further information regarding past connections with bankruptcies and criminal proceed-
ings. For persons employed by the registrant less than five years, it is proposed that
a brief explanation should be included as to the nature of the responsibilities
undertaken by the individual in prior positions to provide adequate disclosure
of the prior business experience. It will be sufficient to give specific information
only as to the number of people supervised, salary, size of operation supervised,
and similar information. What is required is information relative to the level of
his professional competence.
Id. 10. The Commission is apparently groping for objective standards to determine what
must be disclosed. Certainly the inclusion of such considerable amounts of detail will
lengthen the prospectus. Query, however, whether the specific facts requested may
not be more misleading than helpful. The data indicated may well suggest performance
capabilities which the individual does not have in his new position. Good performance in
a particular job is no assurance that a higher position can be well filled. Indeed, it has
been observed that career advancement tends to continue until an individual reaches a
position in which he cannot perform effectively. L. PETE & R. HULL, THE PETE Pam-
cpLE (1969). The fact that a scientist performed brilliantly supervising a 100-man
research department of a large corporation does not necessarily bear on his qualifications
to head a new, small company. In point of fact, many unsuccessful high technology
ventures were founded by men eminently qualified in technical fields who performed
poorly as business managers.
9 o Consider the following two examples dealing with alcoholism. Company A produces
high fashion apparel and is entirely dependent on the creative genius of its founder to
design the line for each new season. Four months ago he started drinking excessively
and for the past two months has been confined to a sanitarium where his response to
treatment has been poor. The founder of Company B has had a serious drinking problem
for years and has been undergoing psychiatric treatment for the past 30 months. In the
first case, disclosure is required to indicate at least the fact that the services of the
founder may be unavailable to the company. (Query if the specific reason for such un-
availability must be disclosed as well.) In the second case disclosure probably is not re-
quired, since the situation is apparently stable and the performance record of the company
for more than two years was achieved notwithstanding the president's disability. Between
these relatively clear-cut cases, one can imagine an infinite spectrum of variations in
which the need for disclosures may be very difficult to determine.
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terially and adversely reflects on management, the half-truth prohibition
may be read very expansively to require disclosure, 1 even if the dollar
amounts involved are below the $30,000 threshold normally required
for disclosure of insider transactions.92 Disclosure probably is not
required if the information is vague, ambiguous, or inconclusive as
to basic integrity-for example, where highly paid executives make
extensive use of company staff and facilities (the lodge, the private
plane, etc.) for personal purposes, openly and to the general knowledge
of the board of directors, although such action is prohibited by the
company policy manual. (By contrast, if a company executive stole
an amount of cash from the company's safe equivalent to the fair
value of the improperly appropriated fringe benefits, disclosure probably
would be required.)
The materiality, and therefore the need for disclosure, of infor-
mation reflecting on management's integrity may vary depending on
whether the individual involved is still connected with the company.
If the dishonest officer has been discharged, one might conclude that
his dishonesty, and the reason for his discharge, are not mandatory
disclosure items; the information may no longer be relevant (assuming
that his past defalcations do not materially impair the condition or
prospect of the company, for example, as a result of large uninsured
91 Franchard Corp., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4710 (July 31, 1964), in [1964-
1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 11 77,113, at 82,038. For further informa-
tion about the prospectus in question, see note 103 infra. At the time the prospectus for
Franchard was prepared, Form S-1, Part I, Item 20, as then interpreted, did not require
disclosure of a management transaction unless it was material to the company as well as
to the individual involved. Prior to that time, many serious conflict of interest situations
were considered to be beyond the scope of required disclosure items, if the dollar amounts
in the transactions were not material to the companies involved-as, for example, where
the president of Chrysler Corporation was discovered to have had a previously undisclosed
interest in a supplier of hardware to Chrysler. See Cohen & Phillips, Conflicts of Interest
and the Federal Securities Laws, 24 FED. BJ. 321, 326-27 (1964); Thanhouser, The
Corporate Counsel's Viewpoint, 17 Bus. LAw. 79 (1961). In Franchard, the contention
was made that the transaction was not material to the company because the amounts
involved were only a small portion of the company's assets. As an alternative ground
for rejecting this contention, the Commission found a material omission because of
the reflection on management's integrity.
For purposes of disclosure, distinctions might be drawn between a member of
management acting improperly for the purpose of furthering the company's interest
(e.g., bribing a building inspector to enable a new plant to open on time) and acting
improperly in his own interest (e.g., embezzling money from the company). We live in
an imperfect world, in which corporate executives sometimes engage in improper activities
in furtherance of corporate interests. Every such impropriety for a corporate purpose
should not be considered ipso facto material to investors, especially where the impropriety
does not threaten the company with serious adverse economic consequences. Kohner v.
Wechsler, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. II 93,537 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). There are limitations on
the extent to which the disclosure provisions of the securities laws should serve as a
vehicle for dealing with unrelated social ills. Indeed the Commission's release requiring
further disclosures relative to civil rights and environmental matters (SEC Securities
Act Release No. 5170 (July 19, 1971)) has been criticized as going beyond legitimate
disclosure objectives to serve other social purposes.
92 E.g., Form S-1, Part I, Item 20, Instruction 6(iv).
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financial losses), and making a disclosure may adversely affect the
company and its shareholders. 3 Yet, in spite of the offender's dis-
charge, the fact of his defalcations may still be a material disclosure
item if it adversely reflects upon the company's internal controls.",
The question may arise whether a filing is deficient for failure to
make disclosures on management's integrity, in the situation where the
guilty party is the only member of management who knows or has
reason to know the facts. The SEC has held that compliance with a
filing requirement turns on whether the filing is or is not accurate in
fact, and not on whether the parties responsibile for its preparation
were guilty or innocent. 5 Accordingly, the fact that only the guilty
member of management knew the facts is irrelevantY6 A court or the
Commission might appropriately relax this approach, however, if only
one officer, especially one not key to the company, knew or had reason
to know of his own undisclosed defalcation. The issue might be ap-
proached in terms of materiality, and a finding made that the particular
undisclosed fact was not material.
B. Diligence and Competence
Disclosure of the degree of diligence and level of competence
exercised by directors and officers would require especially subjective
judgments in an area where there are no clear standards; 97 clearly
filings cannot appropriately give investors all the information they
93 The problems of public disclosure are illustrated by the recent dilemma of
American Airlines, a company which had enjoyed an apparently well-deserved reputation
for total management integrity. When it discovered that a middle-level employee had
taken extensive kick-backs, his employment was terminated and the company referred
the matter to the U. S. Attorney. Top management believed that the company should
have been given credit for bringing the affair into the open and taking vigorous action.
Instead, the company itself was exposed to scandal, thereby damaging internal morale,
the company's relationship with customers and its image on Wall Street. In similar
circumstances, many companies take remedial action (or inaction--some do not even
terminate the employment of the offending employee) with a minimum of public dis-
closure. See The American Way?-How a Brash Manager Used Middle-Level Job for
His Personal Profit, Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1972, at 1, col. 6.
94 For example, if the company is a securities dealer, the fact that serious embezzle-
ment could occur without detection might be, in and of itself, a material disclosure
reflecting upon the rest of management, since effective internal supervision and controls
are essential to a well managed brokerage firm. See, e.g., SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d
981 (7th Cir. 1972).
95 Franchard Corp., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4710 (July 31, 1964), in [1964-
1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f1 77,113, at 82,038; Siltronics, Inc., SEC
Securities Act Release No. 4700 (June 4, 1964).96 Franchard Corp., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4710 (July 31, 1964), in
[1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,113, at 82,038.
97 It is sometimes suggested that financial statements speak for themselves as an
index of management competence, and indeed there may be a correlation between the
competence of management and the historical performance of the company in some
cases. However, historical results do not always tell the whole story about management
competence, especially when dealing with a relatively new enterprise which does not
have sufficient history on which to base a determination,
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desire. Directors may be very active, vocal, well-informed, and indepen-
dent of operating management in directing the company's affairs; or,
they may be passive, "rubber stamps" or "figureheads" who exercise
very little independent judgment or initiative. Officers vary both in
competence and in the degree to which they perform the functions
generally associated with their positions,98 since titles may be allocated
according to seniority or other orders of rank extraneous to functions,
especially in family controlled businesses.
It may well be that an experienced analyst making a personal
investigation could draw very distinct conclusions regarding the dili-
gence and competence of management. However, these are subjects
on which very little disclosure in SEC filings has been required, absent
extreme circumstances. 9 The Commission has noted that the degree of
diligence required of directors is a question to be determined under
state law; there is much divergence and uncertainty in this area, with
the general principles that have evolved furnishing only vague guidance.
Accordingly, the Commission has held that it is not prepared to pass
generally on the adequacy with which directors perform their duties,
although its staff has urged it to do so in at least one case. 00 An at-
tempt to do so would be basically incompatible with the philosophy and
administration of the federal disclosure requirements. "It would either
result in self-serving generalities of little value to investors or grave
uncertainties both on the part of those who must enforce and those
who must comply with that Act."' 0 ' The Commission has thus required
no disclosure concerning the degree of diligence exercised by corporate
directors, except where there is outright fraud, reckless indifference,
virtual abdication of responsibility, or where affirmative representations
are made by which performance can be tested. 2
C. Dependence
A company's dependence upon a particular member of manage-
ment, while perhaps not as subjective a question as management's
9 8 The title of chairman of the board is especially ambiguous in its connotations.
The holder of this position may be anything from a retired figurehead, with few func-
tions other than presiding at board meetings, to the active chief executive officer of the
company.
90 Somewhat more disclosure might be appropriate when dealing with the independent
or noninterested directors of a registered investment company. The Investment Company
Act of 1940 specifically contemplates that they will exercise a significant degree of
responsibility in protecting an investment company against overreaching by its affiliates.
See Mundheim, Some Thoughts on the Duties and Responsibilities of Unaffliated Direc-
tors of Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. Rav. 1058 (1967); Nutt, A Study of Mutual Fund
Independent Directors, 120 U. PA. L. Rav. 179 (1971).
10 0 Franchard Corp., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4710 (July 31, 1964), in [1964-
1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 77,113.
101 Id. at 82,048.
102 Id. at 82,046-48,
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competence, represents another. type of soft information about which
difficult judgments must be made. Disclosures regarding such depen-
dence are made in certain unusual circumstances-for example, where
the company is identified with a notable public figure (such as an
entertainer or sports star), where one person has a unique technological
competence, or, in a service business, where a key individual has par-
ticular personal ties to the company's clientele. Dependence is unlikely
to be disclosed, however, by many "one man" companies, where a
single individual dominates the management by virtue of his position,
his personality, and/or his stock holdings. Even in very large corpora-
tions, with professional managers who are not major stockholders, the
extent to which the chief executive officer "calls the shots" varies widely.
As in the case of judging diligence and competence, however, evaluations
in this area are generally far too subjective to be items of mandatory
disclosure, barring a unique or special circumstance."'
D. Track Record
There have been a number of recent suggestions urging more
disclosure concerning the performance history or "track record" of
management, especially in the context of new or promotional com-
panies.1"4 An analyst making a personal investigation in this area
might be able to assemble enough highly relevant information to make
his own subjective evaluation. However, it is unrealistic, if not impossi-
ble, to require disclosure on this subject by companies in their own
SEC filings. Assume that a company founder or key officer has per-
formed particularly well (or poorly) with a prior employer. It would
rarely be practical for the current employer to include financial or
other detailed information about the officer's prior firm. It could be
more misleading than helpful to state, or imply, that the overall results
103 The Franchard opinion is illustrative in this respect. Although the Commission
found numerous deficiencies in the prospectus regarding management, and the Staff threw
the book at the company and charged still others (see note 100 supra), no deficiency was
charged for failure to emphasize what was acknowledged to be a fundamental fact about
the offering-that the company, a real estate venture, was organized to exploit the talents,
reputation, and management ability of the founder, whose name was in the original
corporate title. The only sentence in the entire prospectus which purported to describe
his background or qualifications read as follows:
Mr. Glickman, whose address is 501 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. has
been President of the Company since its organization and prior to that he was
engaged in the creation and development of real estate investment opportunities
for more than 30 years, was an investor in real property for his own account
and organized and supervised limited partnerships and corporations which
acquired real property and interests therein.
Glickman Corp., Prospectus 33 (Oct. 2, 1961). There were other factual statements in
the prospectus concerning his shareholdings, remuneration, and relations to specific prop-
erties. Id. 33-37. Although he was identified as a "parent" of the company, nothing
therein stated the company's unique dependence upon his skill or public image.
104 See note 89 supra.
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of the prior firm are attributable to the one person in question, even
if he was the chief executive. Nor is it practical, in the normal case,
for an SEC filing to extract information about a prior employer that
would isolate in a meaningful manner the contribution of a particular
former employee.105
A new company may be financed by a venture capital group
which participates significantly in its management. An analyst may be
able to look at the past investments of the group and make some
judgments about the group's performance record in selecting poten-
tially successful companies and assisting in their growth. But it is doubt-
ful whether there is an appropriate and generally applicable means for
a company's SEC filings to detail the performance record of its venture
capital sponsor. It would not be practical, for example, to require an
issuer to include in its prospectus the venture capitalist's financial
statement, or the financial statements of other companies in the latter's
portfolio. Such financial statements in the prospectus of a portfolio
company might be more misleading than helpful. Investments in port-
folio companies may be carried on the venture capitalist's books at
cost; this amount normally would not reflect the success of the port-
folio company, and might not reflect its poor record unless a write-
down had been required in the carrying value of the investment on
the books of the venture capitalist. An increase in net worth of a venture
capital sponsor may result from ten successful investments; or it may
be attributable to one phenomenonally successful investment despite
nine bankruptcies. While factors such as these are theoretically sub-
ject to explanation, they raise so many collateral issues that a promoter's
performance record does not appear generally to be a subject suitable
for discussion in the prospectus of a company the promoter is sponsor-
ing.
Of course, in certain extreme situations, disclosure might be re-
quired. If, for example, an individual who is the key organizer and prin-
cipal executive of a new company organized three similar companies
before, each of which ended in bankruptcy, disclosure should be manda-
tory. 06 However, short of some specific, relevant, and hard informa-
105 Of course, an employer attempting to verify the qualifications of a prospective
new employee would inquire about his prior performance, and might well assemble a
great deal of data that would be highly useful in making an evaluation. However, the
data are likely to be extremely soft, highly subjective, and subject to many qualifications.
Numerous circumstances do, of course, exist when one individual has to evaluate the
prior performance of another. The basic point remains, however, that such an evaluation
may be so subjective, and the factors underlying it so involved with circumstances
extraneous to the current employer, that it would be unrealistic to require (or perhaps
even permit) disclosure of prior management performance records in a filing, except in
rather unusual circumstances where there is highly specific and material data.
1 o 6 See Form 10, Item 6(e)(1), requiring disclosures of bankruptcies within two
years before the time of filing.
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tion of that nature, there are inherent limitations in the extent to which
filings can or should cover the track record of management.
Disclosure of a past track record may be highly appropriate, how-
ever, in situations where the same promoters have organized a series
of similar ventures. For example, in real estate development, oil drilling
programs, and theatrical productions, it is typical for promoters to
constitute each new project as a separate limited partnership. In such
cases, the results achieved by earlier comparable ventures may be
highly relevant to potential investors in a current project.
In the last analysis, an investor in a new and unseasoned com-
pany should know that he is buying something of a pig in a poke
with respect to the character of management. In evaluating management,
he must rely upon the underwriters to a large extent. Indeed, when
dealing with unseasoned issues, one might argue that the past per-
formance record of the underwriter is the track record to be studied
most carefully: How successful has it been in selecting companies to
underwrite which eventually prosper?
E. Implied Representations
As suggested, mandatory disclosure requirements for specific and
material negative information should be interpreted quite expansively
when dealing with various attributes of management, especially integ-
rity. Ultimately, an implied representation of "fair dealing" may
develop in the company management area as it has with respect to
broker-dealer selling practices. The Commission has developed the
implied representation or "shingle" theory that merely by hanging out
his shingle, a broker-dealer makes an implied representation to his
customer that he will deal fairly. A breach of this implied representation
may be actionable.
10 7
10 7 The development of the implied representation or "shingle" theory is reviewed
by (former SEC Chairman) Cohen & Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice Standards,
29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 691, 702-08 (1964); see Comment, Current Problems in
Securities Regulation, 62 MIcH. L. REv. 680, 733-43 (1964). The implied representation
of fair dealing has been held to be breached, and broker-dealers' actions have therefore
been held to be false and fraudulent, in many situations-for example: (1) where a
broker-dealer recommends a security without an adequate basis (violating the ipecific
implied representation that recommendations are made on the basis of actual knowledge
and careful consideration of all reasonably available information), SEC Securities Act
Release No. 4445 (Feb. 2, 1962), in 2 CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. 11 22,753-59 (and cases
cited therein); Schneider, SEC Filings-Their Use to the Professional, 21 FINACIA=.
ANAr.Ysrs J., Jan.-Feb. 1965, at 33; (2) where he charges excessive prices (violating the
specific implied representation that his prices are reasonably related to the current mar-
ket), see, e.g., Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943); Duker &
Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386 (1939); (3) where he does business while insolvent (violating the
specific implied representation that he is solvent and able to discharge his liabilities and
consummate his transactions), see, e.g., SEC v. Kelly Andrews & Bradley, Inc., 341 F.
Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Finchley Investors Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 7416 (Sept. 8, 1964).
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The implied representation rationale could be applied easily to
the corporate management area, providing an effective way of imposing
disclosure obligations. It could be held that by offering its securities to
the public (or by soliciting proxies), a company makes an implied
representation that its management has dealt (and will deal?) fairly
with the company and the investors. it would be quite consistent with
the trend of the law to have such an implied representation cover
matters of honesty. The representation might be interpreted more
broadly-for example, to cover matters of diligence, loyalty and, in
extreme cases, even competence. Indeed, the implied representation
approach has already been suggested as a means of regulating insider
trading in securities."'
VIII. PRICING OF A FIRST OFFERING
As the result of Staff comments, it has been customary for a
prospectus cover page for a first offering to characterize the offering
price as having been determined "arbitrarily." Applying customary
standards of full disclosure, such a statement, hiding as it does much
more than it reveals, is a classic half-truth." 9 Typically, the public
offering price for a first offering is determined by detailed reference to
variables such as past and projected earnings, net worth, and return
on capital. Each factor is minutely evaluated in comparison with
similar companies. There is frequently considerable discussion, highly
revealing about how the parties view the company, in determining which
other companies are or are not considered comparable. Additional
consideration is given to such factors as evaluations of the industry
108 "A vendor who was known by the purchaser to be well informed on the condi-
tion of a company might be held to have represented the security to be 'worth' the price
asked." Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YaLP, L.J. 171, 189-90
n.92 (1933). Professor Loss postulates a somewhat more refined implied representation
(focusing on the insider as buyer): "The insider's offer to purchase at a fixed price might
be deemed to constitute an implied representation that, within reasonable limits, the
stated price represents the insider's judgment of the value of the security." 3 L. Loss,
SEcuaRTis REGULATION 1456-57 (2d ed. 1961).
109 Even if the Commission accepts the typical substitute phrase that the price was
determined "by negotiation," it prohibits any explanation of the negotiations or the
factors considered, so that the statement remains materially incomplete.
As part of its hot issue control proposals, the Commission has proposed further
disclosures on the various factors that were considered in determining the offering price
for securities in a first offering. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5279, at 3, 6 (July 26,
1972). As indicated previously, see note 32 supra & accompanying text, the proposal
seems to focus on high risk ventures in which the "aggregate value being placed on the
outstanding shares of the issuer . . .bears little or no relationship to the issuer's assets,
earnings or other criteria of value." SEC Securities Act Release No. 5279, at 3 (July 26,
1972). The proposal does not seem to be designed for established companies going public
where a relatively high price is justified by historical earnings performance, excellent
prospects, a strong balance sheet, high return on capital, or similar criteria that are in
fact the subject of pricing negotiations.
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(its past trends, long range prospects, and interest to investors) and
the management of the company.
The method of pricing an offering may involve extremely soft
information. However, it is likely that in many cases a transcript of
the negotiations on final pricing would be far more informative to an
investor than the final prospectus. (It is not suggested, however, that
such a transcript is a practical alternative to the prospectus.) As the
Commission well knows, valuation of a security is a subject on which
objective evidence can be marshalled and experts can explain the basis
for their conclusions, although other experts may draw different con-
clusions from the same data. Considering the significance of the pricing
determination, some relaxation of the historical ban on soft information
would be appropriate, making disclosures permissive in this area. In-
vestors should be able to recognize that the data being offered in jusifi-
cation of the offering price is inherently self-serving, and they should
be able to evaluate such data accordingly.
A major purpose of banning soft information is to keep ultimate
value judgments out of a filing. However, this rationale is largely inap-
plicable in the context of pricing. The prospectus must, of necessity,
reflect the ultimate conclusion on value reached by the parties involved
-that is, their determination of the public offering price.
In view of these factors, a company willing to explain the basis
of the pricing negotiations should be permitted (but for the time being
not required..) to do so, within limits, so that investors can make an
independent analysis of the factors considered. The present approach
forces investors to accept the offering price on a take-it-or-leave-it basis,
without benefit of the analysis of the parties most involved. Public
investors do not see this type of information which is often circulated
privately among syndicate members. It is reasonable to allow disclosures
on pricing to be optional and not mandatory. If an issuer wishes to
bolster the credibility of its pricing by explaining how the price was
determined, it should be free to do so. Investors can then analyze such
data. On the other hand, when an issuer elects not to inform the public
meaningfully about the method of pricing, investors will be free to
draw whatever inferences seem appropriate from the fact that no sup-
porting data are offered.
Any policy changes in this area should be taken in small steps and
on an experimental basis. A body of experience should be accumulated
11o In view of considerations discussed above, it would probably be unfair to force
all issuers to make disclosures of this type. In any event, even if disclosures were
mandatory, companies reluctant to discuss specifics would probably retreat to relatively
meaningless generalizations mentioning all of the obvious factors, which would merely
clutter prospectuses without significantly assisting investors.
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at each level, before proceeding to the next level of disclosure. Possibly
a standard format could involve a check list of items which must be
analyzed (if applicable) when information on pricing is to be included
in a prospectus. Ultimately, if experience is favorable, the standardized
disclosures of this type may be made mandatory.
Perhaps permissive disclosures of this type should stop short of
specific dollar earnings projections, to avoid a false appearance of
certainty. But even without firm numbers regarding future expectations,
disclosures could be tailored to indicate the factors considered, the
relative weighting given to each, and similar matters. Hard data, such
as documented, historical industry trends, reported price-earnings ratios
of comparable companies, the issuer's prior growth rate, and its return
on capital, that were part of the price calculation should be included.
Underwriters typically prepare elaborate charts containing relevant
information about the issuer and comparable companies, including data
on sales, price-earnings ratios, net worth, working capital ratios, re-
turn on investment, and other analyses. There are detailed discussions
between issuer and underwriter concerning the relevance of various com-
parisons-for example, the fact that one company deserves a par-
ticularly high price-earnings ratio because of its growth rate, while
another has a particularly low ratio because of a high ratio of debt to
equity. There should be no objection in principle to the inclusion, at
the issuer's election, of such a comparison chart in a prospectus, with
relevant comments about other public companies. Of course, the data
selected for tabulation should be balanced. The issuer should not be
permitted to select only companies or only items of information that
will show a favorable comparison. The issuer should not, however,
be required to warant the accuracy of the information about comparable
companies appearing on the chart. The issuer should warrant only that
the tabulated information reflects data available from public sources
and is reasonably believed to be true. Further guidelines for the presen-
tation of such information could be evolved as experience accumulates.
IX. MARKET AND COMPETITIVE CONDITIONS
Critics of disclosure policy have called for further information in
SEC filings dealing with the market position of the issuer and other
competitive factors. The traditional boilerplate disclosures which
customarily appear in prospectuses have been characterized as "worse
than worthless" by Chairman Casey."' The Commission's hot issue
' 11 Address by SEC Chairman Casey, New York Law Journal and the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York, Apr. 21, 1972, at 8.
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proposals made certain specific recommendations to improve disclosure
in this regard." 2 No doubt there are aspects of market position and
competition where improvements in disclosure are clearly called for; for
example, many companies could do a better job of identifying the indus-
tries in which they compete as well as the specific sources of their
competition. But while better disclosure is advisable, there are several
factors that counsel against making disclosure about competition manda-
tory. Competition is somewhat unique among the disclosure topics in
that it deals primarily with information not relating directly to the
issuer. A company may have relatively little or no information avail-
able about the current and prospective position of its competitors or
the market place as a whole. The information that is available may be
so incomplete or difficult to verify that it would be unfair to adopt
mandatory disclosure requirements under threat of liability for inac-
curacies.
Furthermore, a particular management may have no special quali-
fications, as compared with market analysts or economists generally, to
make industrywide evaluations. Companies may be affected by trends
or developments which their own managements have no expertise in
predicting." In many instances, the sources of information are as
available to investors as they are to the issuer; a particular company
may have no special access to data about its industry."4 Without articu-
lating any of these policy bases for its decision, at least one court has
indicated that a prospectus need not discuss industrywide trends." 5
If mandatory disclosure is extended to evaluations of the issuer's
112E.g., SEC Securities Act Release No. 5276, at 5-6 (July 26, 1972) (proposed
amendments to Form S-i, Item 9(a) (1) and Instruction 1 thereto); SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5279, at 5 (July 26, 1972) (proposed amendment to Guide 5).
113 For example, the market for grass seed is vitally affected by the rate of new
housing construction. Wong, When Housing Booms, So Do Grass Seed, Art, Toilets, Rugs
and Frit, Wall St. J., May 25, 1972, at 1, col. 6. There is no reason to believe that
companies in the grass seed business have an expertise superior to others in the financial
community for prognosticating housing starts.
114The author knows of at least one instance where an investment banking firm
obtained important information about an issuer's competitors which was unavailable
to the issuer itself.
115 Finally, the claim that the prospectus should have predicted the saturation of
the bowling market is unsupported in fact or law. Plaintiff has not offered evi-
dence to support the saturation argument, and moreover, even if such saturation
had been proved, such hindsight predictions do not belong in prospectuses and
might even result in liability for violation of S.E.C. regulations. Under no con-
struction of the securities laws "is an insider obligated to confer upon outside
investors the benefit of his superior financial or other expert analysis by dis-
closing his educated guess or predictions." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, [401
F.2d 833,1 848.
Colonial Realty Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 337 F. Supp. 546, 552-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
Interestingly, the case of Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), also involved the bowling industry. While numerous specific deficiencies
were found in the BarChris prospectus, many of which were failures to disclose adverse
consequences resulting from industry oversaturation, the prospectus was not alleged or
found to be deficient for failing to disclose, as such, this fundamental industrywide trend.
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market, there may be pressure to include market studies in filings. Of
course, almost every company can produce some type of analysis of
its markets and its competitive position, even if it is only the "feel"
of its executives for the industry. Indeed, the intuition of an executive
experienced in the industry may be a much more reliable basis for an
investment decision than an elaborate survey by an outside consultant.
But if there is a mandatory disclosure for market studies "if avail-
able,' 1 6 issuers may be faced with a troublesome dilemma. Since
almost any issuer will have some data available, to disclaim the existence
of a study may expose the issuer to the charge of making a misstatement.
Alternatively, the issuer may feel that the data available is not suf-
ficiently authoritative to include in its prospectus-indeed, it may be
aware of very formal studies which reach conclusions the issuer con-
siders completely erroneous. Furthermore inclusion of a study in a
prospectus may carry with it the implied representation that the study
was reasonable in scope and methodology. This creates a practical prob-
lem, however, since it may be difficult (or impossible), in the context of
a disclosure filing, to describe adequately the scope and limitations of a
market survey, which may range from a superficial examination to an
expensive, in depth analysis. If a disclosure document describes a study
which later events show reached an overly optimistic conclusion, the
company may be hard pressed to explain why the study was not more
comprehensive. Experience teaches us that even the best market surveys
are not necessarily reliable.
17
In the last analysis, the responsibility for verifying the markets
and competitive position of an issuer should rest very heavily with
the broker-dealers distributing or recommending the issuer's securities.
116 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5276, at 6 (July 26, 1972), proposed the follow-
ing new instruction to the Form S-i, Item 9, Description of Business:
Instructions. 1. If the registrant proposes to, or has recently entered or
introduced a new line of business or product requiring the investment of a
material amount of the registrant's resources, indicate whether there have been
market studies performed, briefly describe such studies and furnish supplementally
any report prepared in connection therewith. The present status of product
development should also be disclosed (e.g., whether in planning stage or whether
further development is necessary).
George F. Doriot, President of American Research and Development Corp., and
one of the country's leading venture capitalists, has testified that new companies should
be required to do market research before making a public offering, and should be
required to state in the prospectus whether or not this has been done. CCH Fra. SEC.
L. REP., Report No. 414, at 6 (Mar. 8, 1972) (testimony before SEC's hot-issue hearing).
"i Witness these disasters suffered by well managed giant companies which mis-
calculated the potential for profitable markets: RCA's 1971 $500 million write-off of its
general purpose computer line, after losing hundreds of millions of dollars; General
Foods' $93 million Burger Chef write-off; and the disasters in the automobile industry
with Ford's Edsel and the Kaiser-Fraiser automobiles. See Singing Those Write-Off Blues,
Foamns, Mar. 15, 1972, at 26.
The SEC's recent proposals for expanded proposals about large write-offs would
require a great deal of predictive or soft information in filings. See SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5313 (Oct. 2, 1972).
19721
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A broker-dealer engaged in these activities makes the implied repre-
sentation that it has adequately investigated the company and has made
a professional judgment concerning the securities offered."' The basis of
this economic judgment may be far too complex or subjective to require
a specific analysis in a disclosure document. As in the case of manage-
ment evaluations," 9 there may be inherent limitations in the extent to
which a disclosure filing can or should attempt to educate the public re-
garding competitive and market factors.
X. PROBLEMS OF LIABILITY
A principal objection to soft disclosures in SEC filings is the in-
herent risk of liability if soft information is challenged, an objection
which should not be underestimated. The potential liability for an in-
adequate disclosure document can be enormous. As a matter of proof,
it may be much more difficult to determine the adequacy of a soft dis-
closure, as contrasted with a hard one. (Of course, this factor may work
in favor of the party preparing the disclosure document, since the
burden of proof would normally rest with the party challenging its ade-
quacy.)
Yet, problems of liability should not be overestimated. Those in-
volved with the public securities markets have become accustomed to
dealing with soft information, and they have learned to do so notwith-
standing the ever present risk of liability. Company managements dis-
seminate large amounts of soft information through press releases, com-
munications with analysts, and reports to shareholders. False or mis-
leading disclosures through any of these non-filed channels of com-
munication can expose issuers and their principals to serious liabilities.
The standards for determining the adequacy of a disclosure, as well as
the consequences for inadequate disclosure, do not vary significantly
depending on whether or not the communication is an SEC filing. Yet,
company managements have adapted to making disclosures subject to
these potential liabilities and, by and large, have done a highly responsi-
ble job in communicating soft information to the public.
Likewise, broker-dealers have learned to deal with soft information
despite the risks. Most investment recommendations carry with them
some express or implied soft representation-for example, concerning
the future expectations for the company or the market price of its securi-
118 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 696-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Richmond Corp., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4584 (Feb. 27, 1963), in [1961-1964
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ff 76,904; Charles E. Bailey & Co., 35 S.E.C. 33
(1953). See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5275 (July 26, 1972).
19 See text accompanying note 86 supra.
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ties. Broker-dealers know that if their recommendations are not rea-
sonably based they will be exposed to serious consequences. However,
the risk in dealing with soft information has certainly not deterred the
process of giving investment recommendations.
Withholding of information can also mislead and deceive the in-
vesting public. If important soft information is available, public policy
favors making the best disclosure that can be made in good faith under
the circumstances, rather than total non-disclosure. This approach was
followed in Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp.120 That
case involved an exchange offer registration statement, where the issuer
sought to acquire control of an insurance company which had substantial
"surplus surplus"-that is, excess funds which could be withdrawn
from the insurance company without impairing legally required re-
serves. The amount of surplus surplus concededly was difficult to com-
pute, with estimates ranging from $80 million to $125 million. The is-
suer's future plan to withdraw these funds, as well as the amount of
funds available, both represented soft information. The court held that
the plan to withdraw surplus surplus was an essential part of the eco-
nomic reality of the transaction. Thus, even though the issuer's future
plans were somewhat uncertain, and the dollar amount of excess funds
was hard to estimate, the prospectus was deemed deficient for failing to
make a good faith effort to disclose the issuer's plans and the existence of
the surplus funds. 2'
Public ownership imposes a heavy responsibility on management to
keep public investors adequately informed. There may be occasions
when this responsibility requires hard decisions on how disclosure
should be made-decisions which others can second-guess with the bene-
fits of hindsight. But the mere fact that the decisions are difficult does
not justify the withholding of important information from the public.
Rather, management should be required to make the best disclosure
which can be made under the circumstances.122 Many aspects of man-
120 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
121 Although it was the omission of a relatively objective fact (the existence of the
surplus surplus) which was the most important failure of the issuer, the filing was also
deficient in not estimating the admittedly uncertain amount of the surplus. Moreover,
while the court did not require disclosure of "preliminary contingency planning," id. at
568, it chided the issuer for not apprising the insurance company's shareholders of its
intention "to remove (the surplus] 'as soon as practicable,'" id. at 565.
122 In a release captioned "Notice to Registrants Engaged in Defense and Other
Long Term Contracts and Programs of the Need for Prompt and Accurate Disclosure
of Material Information Concerning Such Activities," SEC Securities Act Release No. 5263
(June 22, 1972), in CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. f[ 78,852, the Commission stated:
[C]osts to be incurred in the performance of [government] contracts and
ultimate profit to be realized often cannot be known in the early stages of the
contract. Accordingly, such matters are necessarily the subject of estimates which
are difficult to make with any certainty. Notwithstanding such difficulties, regis-
trants have an obligation to make every effort to assure that progress on material
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agerial responsibility are fraught with potential risk, but these risks
cannot be completely eliminated without prejudicing legitimate interests
of public investors. Chairman Casey has expressed the point well:
There is little worthwhile in business-or elsewhere-
that does not involve at least some risk; but the ultimate de-
fense is the exercise of sound judgment, not the abdication of
responsibility.as
Of course, it is essential to use a sensible standard in judging the ade-
quacy of a soft disclosure. As has been recognized, 124 a person making a
soft disclosure in good faith and with reasonable prudence should be
protected against liability, even if his opinion or prediction turns out to
be incorrect.
Proposals have been made for a rule to exclude designated items of
soft information in a prospectus from potential liabilities under section
11 of the 1933 Act. There is precedent for exempting a filed document
from liabilities attaching to inadequate "filings."'1 5 Such an approach
may be useful to reduce the potential section 11 liability of underwriters,
directors, controlling persons, and experts. Presumably, potential lia-
bility would remain under the anti-fraud rules, and the public would
thereby be adequately protected.
XI. CoN clUSION
Soft information may be highly relevant to investment decisions.
It is widely used in the financial community. Although the policy rea-
sons for barring it from filings have been, and still are, valid considera-
tions, there are strong countervailing considerations which must be
balanced, particularly the objective of giving investors the maximum
amount of useful information. The prevailing practice has resulted in
filings which convey an artificial or distorted view of economic realities
and withhold a great deal of useful and available information from in-
vestors.
The time has come for a reappraisal. Within controlled limits, and
contracts-such as earnings, losses, anticipated losses or material cost overruns-
is properly reflected in the registrant's financial statements and, where necessary
to a full understanding, discussed in appropriate textual disclosure.
Id. at 81,865 (emphasis added).
123 Address by SEC Chairman Casey, National Industrial Conference Board, Nov.
18, 1971, at 16.
124 Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664 (E-D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 464 F.2d
437 (2d Cir. 1972).
125 1934 Act Rule 13a-13(d), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13(d) (1972) (relating to Form
10-Q). An earlier SEC proposal would have treated only a portion of the Form 10-Q
report as being a "filed" document for purposes of the § 18 liability provision. SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8683 (Sept. 15, 1969).
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on an experimental basis, we should evolve new standards that would
permit, and in some instances require, broader use of soft information in
filings if it is relevant, material, reasonably reliable, and adequately
qualified. There may be a risk that some investors will misuse soft in-
formation or be misled by it. There may be increased risk of liability
against companies and their managements who will face difficult prob-
lems in dealing with soft information. But these risks are acceptable
ones, in view of the corresponding benefits to be realized by giving more
useful information to investors.
A change in prevailing policy seems inevitable. The preceding pages
have explored some of the basic implications that must be considered,
though no attempt has been made to develop a comprehensive set of
specific answers. The objective of this Article has been realized if it helps
articulate the relevant questions and place them in proper perspective.
